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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Armed Forces- Courts-Martial Jurisdiction
over Military Personnel Limited to Service-Connected

Offenses
Petitioner, an army sergeant on leave, broke into a hotel room and
criminally assaulted a young girl.' He was apprehended by civilian
authorities, returned to military control, and subsequently convicted of
attempted rape by general court-martial. 2 The Army Board of Review
and, thereafter, the Court of Military Appeals affirmed.3 Under
confinement in federal prison, petitioner filed for a writ of habeas
corpus in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
contending that the court-martial was without jurisdiction to try him
for nonmilitary offenses committed off-post while on leave. The district
court denied relief and the Couit of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed.' On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,
reversed. A member of the Armed Forces, who has committed crimes
cognizable in civilian courts which are not service-connected, is entitled
to grand jury indictment and trial by petit jury, and cannot be tried
by court-martial. O'Callahanv. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
The Constitution grants to Congress the power to make "Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"-- and
exempts "cases arising in the land and naval forces" from the
requirement of prosecution by grand jury indictment.' These provisions
form the constitutional basis7 for a separate system of military courts
I. Petitioner was stationed at Fort Shafter, Oahu, in the Territory of Hawaii in July 1956.
At the time of the offense, he was in Honolulu on an evening pass, attired in civilian clothes.
2. The court-martial found petitioner guilty of attempted rape, housebreaking, and assault
with intent to rape in violation of Articles 80, 130, and 134 of the UNIIORNI COINE Oi-M.IITARY
JUSTIC. 10 U.S.C. §§ 880. 930. 934 (1964) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
3. United States v. O'Callahan, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 800 (1957). The sentence as approved
provided for confinement at hard labor for ten years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
dishonorable discharge.
4. United States ec rel. O'Callahan v. Parker. 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968), af'g 256 F.
Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. I. § 8,provides in part: 'The Congress shall have Power ... to raise
and support Armies . . .To Provide and maintain a Navy . . . To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . .To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ....6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. provides in part: "'Noperson shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces ....
7. It was originally assumed that the fifth amendment was a source of military jurisdiction.
Courts. therefore, sustained jurisdiction if the case had arisen in the land or naval forces. See.
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which have historically denied the rights of grand jury indictment and
trial by petit jury.8 The Supreme Court early upheld congressional
proscription of these constitutional guarantees as a valid exercise of
regulatory power granted by the Constitution.' Moreover, civilian
courts do not exercise direct review of court-martial sentences, 0 and the
Supreme Court, in a number of early decisions," developed the rule
e.g., Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. I (1921) (sustaining military jurisdiction over dishonorably
discharged military prisoner). In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), Mr.
Justice Black rejected that concept: "This provision [the fifth amendment] does not grant courtmartial power to Congress; it merely makes clear that there need be no indictment for such
military offenses as Congress can authorize military tribunals to try under its Article I power to
make rules to govern the armed forces." 350 U.S. at 14 n.5. See generally F. WIENER. CIVILIANS
UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE 305-14 (1967).
Some confusion still exists as to the effect of the fifth amendment exemption. Mr. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the majority in the instant case states, "ifthe case does not arise 1in
the
land and naval forces,' the accused gets first the benefit of an indictment by grand jury and
second, a trial by jury .... " 395 U.S. at 262. See also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES (rev. ed. 1969), which still cites the fifth amendment as a source of military jurisdiction.
8. The UCMJ provides for three types of courts-martial with varying jurisdiction,
procedures, and sentencing powers. See UCMJ, arts. 16-54, 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-54 (1964), as
amended, the Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1335. A general court-martial, at the time
of petitioner's trial, consisted of at least five officers (analogous to a petit jury) and a law officer
(analogous to a judge). The law officer, trial and defense counsel are required to be members of
the Bar and certified by the Judge Advocate General. UCMJ, art. 25(c), 10 U.S.C. § 825(c)
(1964), provides that at least one-third of the members of a court-martial trying an enlisted man
are required to be enlisted men if the accused so requests. In practice the accused seldom makes
this request. See generally Schiesser, Trial by Peers: Enlisted Members on Courts-Martial, 15
CATH. U.L. REV. 171 (1966). Two-thirds of the members are required to concur for a finding of
guilty and for purposes of determining the sentence. Special courts-martial (consisting of at least
three officers) and summary courts-martial (one officer) take cognizance of less serious offenses
and are empowered to award correspondingly lower punishments. See generally Note,
Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUVt. L. REv. 127 (1964);
Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review oj Court-Martial Convictions,
61 COLUI. L. REV. 40, 56-57 (1961); Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals and
Military Due Process, 35 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 242-43, 248-50 (1960). For recent discussions of
the effect of the Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1335, on courts-martial procedures, see
Ervin, The Military Justice Act of 1968, 45 MILITARY L. REV. 77 (1969); Comments, I I A.F.
JAG. L. REV. (No. 2) 175-98 (1969).
9. E.g., Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879). "The constitutionality of the acts of Congress
touching army and navy courts-martial in this country, if there could ever have been a doubt
about it, is no longer an open question in this court." 100 U.S. at 21. "[T]he power of Congress,
in the government of the land and naval forces and of the militia, is not at all affected by the
fifth or any other amendment." Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Vall.) 2, 138 (1866) (dictum).
10. E.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946); In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900); Exparte
Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 243 (1864); Administrative Procedure Act § 2(a), 5
U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1964) (courts-martial expressly excluded from appellate procedure); UCMJ,
art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964).
II. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1950); Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S.
695 (1949); Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496, 498 (1900); Exparte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1882).
But see Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 144 (1953) (opinion by Vinson, C.J. in.which Justices
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that in collateral proceedings brought in federal courts, inquiry would
be limited to whether the military court had jurisdiction and possessed
the power to impose the sentence. Jurisdiction of courts-martial was
initially limited to trial and punishment of offenses having a direct
impact on discipline. 12 Congress, however, in subsequent revisions of

the Articles of War,'gradually erased this limitation. 3 With the
enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950,14 courtmartial jurisdiction extended to all crimes committed by servicemen
Reed, Burton, and Clark concurred). Federal courts have power on habeas corpus by military
prisoner to review claims of fundamental unfairness when military courts have manifestly refused
to consider such claims. See also Kennedy v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks,
377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967). The court's inquiry would embrace the question of whether the
petitioner was denied any basic constitutional right.
12. The first complete American Articles of War were adopted by the Act of April 10,
1806, ch. 20, § I, arts. 1-101, 2 Stat. 359, reprinted in 2 W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS

1509 (2d ed. 1896) [hereinafter cited as

WINTHROP].

No provision of the 1806

Articles specifically denounced common law crimes, such as murder and robbery. Article 59
expressly provides for the surrender of military personnel charged with civil offenses to civil
authorities upon request. Although article 99 provided for court-martial punishment of all crimes
not capital, and disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline,
offenses cognizable under this "general" article had a 'reasonably direct and palpable" impact
on military discipline. 2 WINTHROP 1123. See Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing
Arny: Another Problem of Court-MartialJurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REV. 435, 446 (1960). For
discussions treating the separate Articles for the Government of the Navy, see Pasley & Larkin,
The Naval Court-Martial,Proposalsfor Its Reform, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1947).
13. Courts-martial were authorized to try various civil crimes, in time of war, regardless
of the impact on discipline. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 736. The requirement
of the 1806 Articles for delivery of military offenders to civil authorities in case of civil crimes
was limited to peace-time situations. Articles of War, 1874, Rev. Stat. § 1342, art. 59 (1875),
reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, supra note 12,' at 1529. Military jurisdiction was extended to specific
non-caoital crimes committed in peace-time, regardless of the impact on discipline, to murder and
rape committed outside the United States, and to civilians accompanying armed forces overseas.
Articles of War, 1916, ch. 418, 39 Stat. 650. For general discussions of the gradual expansion of
courts-martial jurisdiction, see Bishop, Court-MartialJurisdiction Over Military-Civilian
Hybrids: Retired Regulars. Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 32127 (1964); Duke & Vogel, supra note 12, at 449-55.
14. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169 64 Stat. 107, as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964)
The UCMJ was widely acclaimed as a significant advance in the administration of military
justice. It established uniform court-martial procedures in all armed services, incorporated rules
and practices similar to federal courts, and did much to alleviate situations of command influence,
utilization of unqualified counsel, and other flagrant violations of due process. See Morgan, The
Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953). See generally
Symposium, Professor Morgan and the Drafting of the Code, 28 MILITARY L. REV. I (1965); A
Symposium on Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 161 (1953); Spindler, The Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1084 (1952). Significant advances involved appellate
procedure, including the establishment of the Court of Military Appeals, composed of three
civilian judges appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. See generally
-Bishop, supra note 8, at 57 n.87; Quinn, supra note 8; Brosman, The Court: Freer Than Most, 6
VAND. L. REV. 166 (1953); Walker & Neibank, The Court of Military Appeals-Its History.
Organization,and Operation, 6 VAND. L. REV. 228 (1953).
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and civilians accompanying armed forces abroad, whether in time of

peace or war. 5 In cases challenging the expanded jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court consistently held a defendant's "status" as a member
of the Armed Forces to be a sufficient basis for the exercise of court-

martial jurisdiction. 6 Similarly, the Court, in a line of recent decisions,
struck down military jurisdiction over civilians because requisite
7
military status was lacking. In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,"

the Court held unconstitutional the Uniform Code provision
authorizing trial by court-martial of a discharged serviceman" for
offenses committed while an active member of the Armed Forces. In
decisions following Toth,19 the Court completely removed civilians
from military jurisdiction except when in service with Armed Forces
abroad in time of war. In no case, however, did the Court question the

power of Congress to determine the type of offenses which render
servicemen amenable to trial and punishment by court-martial.
15.

UCMJ, arts. 118, 120, 10 U.S.C. §§ 918, 920 (1964), made murder and rape occurring

in the United States punishable by court-martial, thereby removing the one remaining restriction
on the exercise of military jurisdiction. Military courts now acquired concurrent jurisdiction with
civil courts over crimes of servicemen which were at the same time violations of the UCMJ and
offenses cognizable by civil tribunals. The court whose jurisdiction first attached could proceed
to try the offender. UCMJ, art. 14, 10 U.S.C. § 814 (1964), provides for delivery of servicemen
charged with civil crimes to civil authorities upon request.
Since federal and state governments are separate "sovereigns," a prior conviction or
acquittal by court-martial is no defense to subsequent proceedings in a state court, or vice-versa.
All that is necessary is that the crime be in violation of military law and the law of the state.
See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1920).
Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
16. E.g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 348 (1907); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S.
109, 114 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 184-85 (1886); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S.
509 (1879); Exparie Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
17. 350 U.S. 11(1955). Toth, a discharged airman, had brought habeas corpus proceedings
against the Secretary of the Air Force to prevent his return to Korea to stand trial by courtmartial on a charge of murder. Military authorities had not discovered Toth's complicity in the
case until after his return to the United States and honorable discharge. Although his
apprehension had been under the recapture provision. UCMJ, art. 3, 10 U.S.C. § 803 (1964),
the Court concluded "status" as a member of the Armed Forces was the basis of jurisdiction
and ruled the recapture provision unconstitutional. See note 7supra.
18. Toth was an honorably discharged serviceman. Military authorities continue to exercise
court-martial jurisdiction over dishonorably discharged military prisoners. The most recent
Supreme Court decision, Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. I (1921), upheld this practice and the Court
has refused to review rulings of lower courts which have followed Kahn v. Anderson. E.g., Ragan
v. Cox, 320 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 981 (1964); Simcox v. Madigan,
298 F.2d 742 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962).
19. McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960)
(denying military jurisdiction over peace-time civilian employees of Armed Forces overseas);
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
(denying military jurisdiction over civilian dependants of military personnel accompanying them
overseas).
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In the instant case, the Court recognized the necessity for a
specialized system of military courts, but reasoned that the proscription
of grand jury indictment and trial by jury required that jurisdiction be
limited to a scope absolutely essential to the maintenance of discipline.
The Court rejected the contention of the United States 20 that the
petitioner's "status" as a soldier was in and of itself a sufficient basis
for military jurisdiction regardless of the nature of the offense.
Examining English and American military history, the Court
determined that court-martial trials of soldiers were traditionally
limited to crimes that bore a direct relationship to military discipline.
Recognizing that Congress, in the exercise of its regulatory power, had
purposely extended military jurisdiction to crimes of a civilian nature,
the Court, nevertheless, concluded that "harmony" with the Bill of
21
Rights required limiting jurisdiction to service-connected offenses.
Noting that the petitioner's offenses were committed while on leave
from post in United States territory at a time of peace, bore no relation
to his military duties, and were cognizable in accessible civil courts, the
Court held that he could not be tried by court-martial. Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting, 22 found adequate bases for sustaining military
jurisdiction in the constitutional provisions empowering Congress to
make regulations for the Armed Forces and under the Court's prior
decisions holding "status" as a member of the Armed Forces to be
sufficient for the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction.
The instant Court has abandoned a century of precedent2 3 and
restricted the heretofore unchallenged power of Congress to determine
the type of offense which may be tried by courts-martial. In terms of
immediate impact, the decision removes from military jurisdiction
crimes of servicemen which, like the petitioner's, are of purely civilian
character. Moreover, military prisoners serving court-martial sentences
for crimes of this category have acquired a promising ground on which
to base habeas corpus proceedings 4 Beyond this, however, the decision
20. " 'Status' is necessary for jurisdiction; but it does not follow that ascertainment of
'status' completes the inquiry, regardless of the nature, time, and place of the offense." 395 U.S.

at 267.
21. "For it is assumed that an express grant of gen ral power to Congress is to be exercised
in harmony with express guarantees of the Bill of Rights." d. at 273.
22. "[T]his Court has consistently asserted that military 'status' is a necessary and

sufficient condition for the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction ...[and] has never previously
questioned . . . that, given the requisite military status, it is for Congress and not the Judiciary
to determine the appropriate subject-matter jurisdiction of courts-martial." Id. at 275-76

.(dissenting opinion).
23.
24.

Seecases cited notes 16, 17& 19 supra.
It is not clear whether the instant decision will have a retroactive application. Military
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portends no small amount of confusion for military and civilian
officials alike. The Court did not accurately define the scope of
"service-connection" for purposes of determining court-martial
jurisdiction. Although in its analysis of petitioner's offenses, the Court

emphasized the presence of certain factors and the absence of others,"
no general standard is provided. Nor does the Court indicate whether

the "service-connected" test is to apply to crimes committed by
servicemen stationed abroad. While pointing out that the petitioner's
offenses occurred in United States territory, the Court did not expressly
limit its holding to offenses committed within this country. Application
of the instant ruling to United States forces overseas will cause

practical problems of considerable magnitude. 6 In any case, military
authorities have flatly rejected the possibility. See, e.g., United States v. Burkhart, 5 CRI., L.
REP. 2421 (U.S.A.F. Bd. Rev. July 27, 1969).
25. -In the present case petitioner was on leave when he committed the crimes with which
he is charged. There was no connection-not even the remotest one-between his military duties
and the crimes in question. The crimes were not committed on a military post or enclave; nor
was the person whom he attacked performing any duties relating to the military. Moreover,
Hawaii, the situs of the crime, is not an armed camp under military control, as are some of.qur
far-flung outposts. Finally, we deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority stemming from
the war power. Civil courts were open. The offenses were committed within our territorial limits,
not in the occupied zone of a foreign country. The offenses did not involve any question of the
flouting of military authority, the security of a military post, or the integrity of military
property." 395 U.S. at 273-74.
26. Under international law, foreign courts have jurisdiction over all crimes committed
within their territorial borders. Where concurrent jurisdiction has been ceded to United States
military authorities, it has been by mutual agreement and in terms defined by treaty. See, e.g.,
NATO Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846,
With overseas military commanders powerless to try and punish offenses which are not "serviceconnected," the foreign sovereign will probably assert its own jurisdiction unless Congress can
provide other means for handling these cases. It is doubtful, however,.that a practical alternative
to military jurisdiction can be found. Congress would not likely attempt to constitute civil courts
in the many foreign countries where American forces are deployed. Even if it is assumed that the
foreign sovereign would consent, the problems inherent in administering a system of federal courts
abroad militate strongly against such a course. Equally unattractive is the prospect of returning
servicemen to the United States for trial. The large number of petty civil crimes involving
servicemen would create an intolerable burden and ultimately impair military efficiency.
Moreover, a proceeding in the United States would involve difficulties in insuring speedy trial,
production of evidence, and compulsory process. In light of these considerations, it is probable
that the serviceman charged with a civil offense would be tried by the foreign court of original
jurisdiction. Delivery of American servicemen to foreign authorities for trial is constitutionally
permissible. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1956). It is submitted, however, that this result was
not within the contemplation of the instant Court, whose primary concern was that servicemen
should not be denied basic constitutional rights. Clearly, trial by an American court-martial in
which practices and procedures approach standards of due process, would be preferable to trial
in many foreign courts. When United States forces are engaged in combat operations in a foreign
country, the exprcise of military jurisdiction over all offenses committed by servicemen can
probably be sustained on the basis of the war powers of Congress. But cj. Latney v. Ignatius. 38
U.S.L.W. 2015 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1969), discussed at note 28 infra.
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authorities having custody of offenders will likely strain to find a
service-connection when possible 7 At the same time, the court-martial
defendant, in all cases of questionable service-connection, now has a

valid and promising ground for appeal.2 1 Cases decided since
O'Callahan suggest that the meaning of "service-connected" is to be

the subject of much litigation!' The Court of Military Appeals will
undoubtedly provide
opportunity.!9

interpretative

guidance

at its earliest

The applicability of the Bill of Rights to members of the Armed
27. The Judge Advocate General of the Army on June 4, 1969, two days after the instant
case was decided, advised army commands: .:'Pending clarification in future judicial decisions,
O'Callahan v. Parker is construed to preclude trial by court-martial only in those cases arising
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and which are unequivocally not, repeat
not, service connected ....
" Among the grounds for finding service connection suggested by
the JAG opinion were "a factual relation to military effectiveness . . . [and] [tihe fact that
defendant was in uniform or otherwise identified with the military.
... 5 CRIM. L. REP. 2229
(June II, 1969).
28. E.g., Latney v. Ignatius, 38 U.S.L.W. 2015 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1969). In that case,
the petitioner was a merchant seaman serving aboard a vessel chartered by the United States Navy
Military Sea and Transportation Service engaged in supplying United States Forces in Vietnam.
One evening, while on liberty in the port of DaNang, Vietnam, petitioner killed a fellow seaman
in a knife-fight. The military exercised jurisdiction under UCMJ, art. 2 (10), 10 U.S.C. § 802
(10) (1964), which confers jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying armed forces
"in the field" in time of war. The federal district court denied petitioner's application for habeas
corpus, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. The court held that under
the "spirit" of O'Callahan and the precedents cited therein, the military was without jurisdiction
to try petitioner even in time of "undeclared war."
29. In United States v. Reid, 5 CRIm. L. REP. 2329 (U.S. Navy Bd. Rev. June 11, 1969),
military jurisdiction was sustained over a sailor's unlawful use of LSD off base; the Board finding
service-connection in the Navy's obligation to furnish the sailor with medical care should the
activity prove detrimental to his health and the possibility that the activity could render him unfit
for military duties. In United States v. Muller, 5 CRIm. L.REP. 2401 (U.S. Army Bd. Rev. July
24, 1969), a soldier's off-base sale of marijuana to another soldier was an offense triable by courtmartial under O'Callahan; the victim was not a civilian and wrongful possession and sale of
marijuana is recognized conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. In United States v.
Burkhart, 5 CRI.%. L. REP. 2421 (U.S.A.F. Bd. Rev. July 27, 1969), the many substantial benefits
accorded servicemen's dependents by the Armed Forces, rendered the offense of bigamy "serviceconnected" under the O'Callahan test.
29.1 While this comment was at galley stage, the United States Court of Military Appeals
handed down a group of decisions construing O'Callahan. In its expository opinion in United
States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969), the court, over the vigorous dissent of
Chief Judge Quinn, held that a court-martial was without jurisdiction to fry an army captain for
rape and other offenses against civilians committed off-post in a non-duty status. The military
court, in giving O'Cal/ahan broad application, noted that "the Court's language in O'Callahan
. . . indelibly returned military law to its earlier limited scope.
... Chief Judge Quinn, in an
extended dissenting opinion, concluded that the decision's applicability was limited by the
requirement that the serviceman's crime be cognizable in a federal court before military jurisdiction
could be challenged. Illustrative of the divided court's interpretation of O'Callahan are the
following recent decisions: United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969)
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Forces has long been an unsettled question ° The instant Court was
understandably concerned that citizens should not, by virtue of military
service, be stripped of basic constitutional rights. The Court
recognized, however, that the exigencies of military discipline require
some distinction between the rights of soldiers and those of civilians.
In determining the permissible scope of court-martial jurisdiction, the
Court relied on a construction of the Constitution which requires that
an express grant of power be exercised in "harmony" with the express
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The harmony contemplated by the
Court presupposes a balancing of competing government and
individual interests. It is submitted, however, that the Court largely
ignored legitimate government interests in retaining military
jurisdiction over civilian-type offenses
Moreover, in its preoccupation
with the plight of servicemen facing court-martial, the Court
(court-martial jurisdiction sustained for offenses of use and possession of marijuana since these
offenses have a special military significance); United States v. Crapo, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 594, 40
C.M.R. 306 (1969) (court-martial without jurisdiction to try offenses of attempted robbery which
occurred in civilian community, but had jurisdiction to try the accused for robbery commenced on
military reservation and completed in civilian community); United States v. Castro, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969) (court-martial without jurisdiction to try offense of
carrying a concealed weapon where the accused was apprehended as an unauthorized absentee and
delivered to military authorities prior to the weapon's disclosure); United States v. Henderson, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 601,40 C.M.R. 313 (1969) (court-martial without jurisdiction to try offenses of carnal
knowledge which occurred off base even though victim was daughter of another serviceman); United
States v. Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 603, 40 C.M.R. 315 (1969) (court-martial without jurisdiction to
try offense of larceny of an'automobile in civilian community even though the accused was
apprehended on a military base); United States v. Williams 18 U.S.C.M.A. 605, 40 C.M.R. 317
(1969) (court-martial had jurisdiction to try worthless check offenses based on checks cashed at
military exchangebut not for checks cashed at grocery in the civilian community); United States v.
Paxiao, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 608,40 C.M.R. 320 (1969) (court-martial had jurisdiction to try offense or
wrongful appropriation of civilian owned vehicle where taking occurred on military base).
30. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a plurality in Reid v. Covert, stated: "As yet it
has not been clearly settled to what extent the Bill of Rights and other protective parts of the
Constitution apply to military trials." 354, U.S. at 37. Historically, servicemen have never enjoyed
rights of freedom of speech, bail, and jury trial. On the other hand, the UCMJ preserves many
constitutional rights to the court-martial defendant, including prohibitions against selfincrimination, cruel and unusual punishments, and command influence. See Wiener, CourtsMartial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARV. L. REV. 266 (1958), for a
position that the Bill of Rights was never intended to apply to members of the Armed Forces,
and Henderson, Courts-Martialand the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARv. L.
REV. 293 (1957) for the opposite view. See also Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the President: An
Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1697
(1968); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 186 (1962); Note,
Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE L.J. 380 (1966).
31. The Government interests ignored are aptly detailed in the dissenting opinion. 395 U.S.
at 281-83. Basic to these interests is the advantage of retaining control over the serviceman, and
if practical, having him continue to perform his duties. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
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apparently overlooked two important considerations. First, substantial
improvements in the administration of military justice have been
realized in recent years,32 and secondly, in many situations it could be
to the advantage of a serviceman charged with an offense of a civilian
nature to remain in military custody3 3 Finally, the Court's concern

with the court-martial practice at the time of the Revolution seems out
of place when considering the practical problem of maintaining
discipline among the more than three million men in uniform today.
These considerations suggest that the holding of the instant decision is
overly broad. It is not contended that the disposition of this petitioner's

claim is improper. Clearly his offenses could have been appropriately
tried in civilian courts. On the other hand, there undoubtedly will be

situations in which court-martial cognizance of offenses not "serviceconnected" will be in the best interests of the United States and the

serviceman alike. It is hoped that the Court, in future litigation, will
provide specific guidelines which will enable authorities to make a

realistic determination of the appropriate subject matter for courtmartial jurisdiction 3
UNITED STATES
20b (rev. ed. 1969). The offender who remains under military jurisdiction can
also be transferred with this unit if the needs of the service dictate. Id.
8. If required to remain
in the civil jurisdiction he is a loss to the military (e.g., sailors required to remain in a port-ofcall and miss their ship's movement). The flexibility of military punishments-such as forfeiture
of pay, restriction to limits, and hard labor without confinement-permits many convicted
servicemen to remain on the job. Id.
126(g), (h) & (k). Moreover, many servicemen confined
in post brigs perform worthwhile functions for the command and undergo rehabilitative measures
oriented toward returning them to full duty. Habitual offenders as well as persons charged with
more serious crimes might well be turned over to civil authorities. There remains, however, a
variety of situations in which the Government's interests are clearly served by retaining
jurisdiction.
32. Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1335. See, e.g., Butler, The Revolution in
Military Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 1194 (1968) (for view that court-martial defendants now enjoy
substantially the same rights as do civilians). See generally notes 8 & 14 supra.
33. The practical considerations outlined in note 31 supra apply as well to the serviceman.
Moreover, a serviceman detained by civil authorities because of his own misconduct will be liable
to trial by court-martial upon his return to military control for the offense of unauthorized
absence. See UCMJ, art. 86, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1964). Also to be considered is the likelihood
that many servicemen would prefer to be tried by a military court rather than face a civilian jury
whose members possess anti-military sentiments and, in some cases, racial prejudice.
34. It is hoped "that the searching criticism of the bench and bar may, as it has on other
occasions, convince a new or future majority of the Supreme Court of the error of O'Callahan."
United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 545,40 C.M.R. 257 (1969) (Quinn, C.J., dissenting).
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Constitutional Law-Desegregation- Public Housing Authority
Required to Build Most Units in White Neighborhoods
Plaintiffs, Negro tenants and applicants for public housing, sought
a declaratory judgment against defendant Chicago Housing Authority,
alleging that discriminatory tenant assignment and site selection
practices violated their rights under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, section 16 of the 1870 Civil Rights Act,' and
section 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. 2 Plaintiffs also requested a
permanent injunction against racial discrimination in public housing,
an order requiring defendants to submit and implement a new nondiscriminatory plan for site selection, and a declaratory judgment
under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allowing the plaintiffs to
seek an injunction against the use of federal funds to perpetuate racial
discrimination in public housing.' The district court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss two counts in the complaint,4 but ruled
that plaintiffs had the right to prove defendant's site selection and
tenant assignment policies were intentionally designed to maintain
residential segregation. Defendant admitted imposing Negro quotas in
four projects, but claimed the City Council was responsible for the
selection of sites on the basis of the racial composition of the
neighborhood. 5 On motions for summary judgment in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, held,
judgment for plaintiffs. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment is violated when a public housing authority's tenant
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 [1964): "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and propety as is enjoyed by white citi ens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exceptions of every kind, and to no other."
2. Id. § 1983 (1964): "Every person w~ho, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territor, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within tlb jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
3. Id. § 2000(d) (1964): "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
4. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. III. 1967). The court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss two counts in which plaintiffs failed to allege there was a
deliberate effort to deprive them of their constitutional rights.
5. Illinois law provides that the City Council must approve all sites before they are
acquired. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 677,, § 9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).

1969]

RECENT CASES

1387

assignment and site selection policies are deliberately designed to
maintain existing patterns of residential segregation. Gautreaux i,'.
Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. I11.1969).
Granting relief, the court issued a specific and detailed plan for the
defendant to follow in achieving integration in public housing,
including provisions that three-fourths of all new housing projects must
be located in white neighborhoods, and that only one-half of the
dwelling units in housing projects can be made available to
neighborhood residents. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority.
Civil Action No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill., filed July 1, 1969).
During the decade following passage of the Housing Act of 1937,1,
the Supreme Court's "'separate but equal" doctrine7 was adopted by
the United States Housing Authority8 and followed by several courts

which ruled that racial segregation in public housing projects was not
prohibited by the Constitution. The Supreme Couft's 1917 decision"'
that a racial zoning ordinance violated the fourteenth amendment was

used as authority for holding some racial segregation laws
unconstitutional," but the decision did not affect the early cases

involving discrimination in public housing. 2 A new trend developed in
1948 with the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer that states could not
enforce racially restrictive covenants in leases.13 Following this line of

development, several courts held that segregation in public housing was
a violation of the equal protection clause. 14 These decisions, coupled
6. United States Housing Act of 1937,50 Stat. 888, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
7. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. Comment, The Public Housing Administration and Discriminationin Federally Assisted
Low-Rent Housing, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 871, 875-76 (1966). The United States Housing Authority
administered the low-rent housing program from 1937 to 1947, when the Public Housing
AsIministration was established. For a history of public housing in the United States, see Special
Project-Public Housing, 22 V'AND. L. REv. 875, 882-92 (1969).
9. See, e.g.. Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Denard v. Housing Auth.,
203 Ark. 1050, 159 S.W.2d 764 (1942); Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940).
10. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
II. See, e.g.. Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 103 A. 910 (1918); Clinard v. City of WinstonSalem, 217 N.C. 119, 6 S.E.2d 867 (1940); Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P.2d 1054
(1935). All these cases involve racial zoning ordinances.
12. It has been suggested that the Buchanan decision could have been used as authority to
prohibit intentionally segregated public housing, because in both cases-racial zoning and
intentionally segregated public housing-the object of the state's action was to restrict each race
to its own living accommodations. Note, Racial Discriminationin Housing, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
515, 517 (1959).
13. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
14. See, e.g., Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955); Jones v. City of
Hamtramck, 121 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Vann v. Metro. Housing Auth., 113 F. Supp.
210 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Banks v. Housing Auth., 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert.
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with the desegregation cases of 1954,5 made it clear that government-

supported segregation would no longer be permitted." Since 1954,
federal and state decisions have held that states cannot provide

"separate but equal" housing facilities.

Despite the developments in

the case law, President Kennedy's Executive Order in 1962 represents

the first time the federal government declared racial discrimination in
public housing projects to be against public policy. 8 Legislation
prohibiting segregation in public housing was included in the Civil
Rights Act of 196419 and in the Fair Housing Act of 1968.20 The
Housing Assistance Administration supplemented the legislation with

regulations designed to promote desegregation through tenant

assignment 2' and site selection procedures 2 Nevertheless, there has

been little significant progress in efforts to achieve integration in public
3
housing!
Until recently, concern has centered on tenant assignment policies;

the question of discrimination in site selection has received relatively
little judicial attention. Several decisions, however, have held that local

housing authorities have broad discretion in site selection and that
courts should not interfere with or control the site selection procedure

unless the local agency is acting in bad faith or in violation of the law. 21

These decisions have been supplemented by the holding that selection
denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954); Seawell v. MacWithey, 2 N.J. Super. 255, 63 A.2d 542, rev'd and
remanded, 2 N.J. 563, 67 A.2d 309 (1949) (matters brought out on appeal showed an absence or
discrimination); Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (1954) (ruling that a racial
quota system in admitting persons to public housing projects is discriminatory).
15. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
16. See Comment, supra note 8, at 876.
17. Note, supra note 12, at 518.
18. See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1962). The Executive Order was applied
only to those projects entered into by the federal government and the local authority after the
effective date of the order. Comment, supra note 8, at 879. See also Special Project-Public
Housing. supra note 8, at 909-10, 938 (1969).
19. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1964).
20. Fair Housing Act of 1968, tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3603 (Supp. 1969).
21. 24 C.F.R. § 1.6(d) (1969) requires recipients of federal funds to inform applicants or
the protections available against discrimination. For a survey of the various tenant assignment
plans, see Special Project-Public Housing, supra note 8, at 938-40.
22. "Any proposal to locate housing only in areas of racial concentration will be prima
facie unacceptable . . . [except on] a clear showing, factually substantiated, that no acceptable
sites are available outside the areas of racial concentration." Low-RENT HOUSING
MANUAL § 205.1(2)(g) (1968).
23. See Special Project-Public Housing, supra note 8, at 937-44.
24. See, e.g., Varnadoe v. Housing Auth., 221 Ga. 467, 145 S.E.2d 493 (1965) (involving
city housing authority's action to condemn land for a low-rent housing project); In re Housing
Auth., 235 N.C. 463, 70 S.E.2d 500 (195-2) (involving proceeding to condemn a portion of a
college campus as a site for a public housing project).
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of a project site in an all-Negro area is not a violation of constitutional
rights absent proof of an intent to promote racial segregation. 5 In
addition, recent cases indicate that the equal protection clause and the
supporting civil rights statutes" are being employed to attack alleged
de facto residential segregation fostered by discriminatory urban
renewal and zoning practices 7 Traditionally, courts finding practices
which promote racial segregation have issued declaratory and
injunctive relief against the local housing authority? Some courts have
enjoined housing authorities from continuing their discriminatory
practices; 21 others have issued mandatory injunctions compelling
housing authorities to take affirmative action to integrate their
facilities ° Some plaintiffs have been permitted to apply to the court
at later dates for rehearings to determine if the defendants have acted
in good faith to end the existing segregated facilities.3 The
responsibility for formulating and implementing a plan to correct an
unconstitutional condition has fallen initially on the defendant; 32 the
25. Thompson v. Housing Auth., 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966). An analogous
situation, site selection for public schools, has resulted in the holding that it is unconstitutional
to select sites in such a manner as to promote segregation. Kelley v. Altheimer, Ark., Pub. School
Dist., 378 F.2d 483, 497 (8th Cir. 1967); accord, Betts v. County School Bd., 269 F. Supp. 593
(W.D. Va. 1967).
26. Civil Rights Act of 1870, § 16, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1871,
§ 1,42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). See notes I & 2 supra.
27. See Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich. 1969); Dailey v. City of
Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
28. See cases cited note 14 supra. Some courts have refused to grant injunctions against
local housing authorities due to the abstention doctrine. See Special Project-PublicHousing,
supra note 8, at 935-36. Courts which have enjoined housing authorities from discriminatory
policies generally have not based their injunctions on section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The Supreme Court, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961),
held that a municipality is not a "person" within the meaning of section 1983. In Randell v.
Newark Housing Auth., 384 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), the Third Circuit cited Monroe as authority
for affirming a district court decision that the public housing authority could not be enjoined
under section 1983 from evicting the plaintiff tenants. The Monroe decision, however, has been
attacked on several grounds, and an increasing number of federal district and appellate courts
are enjoining municipalities and municipal agencies under section 1983 without even mentioning
Monroe. 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. Lin. L. REV. 225, 228-30 (1967).
29. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Hamtramck, 121 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Taylor v.
Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (1954); Seawell v. MacWithey, 2 N.J. Super. 255,
63 A.2d 542 (1949), rev'd and remanded, 2 N.J. 563, 67 A.2d 309 (1949) (matters brought out
on appeal showed an absence of discrimination).
30. See, e.g., Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955). See also Banks v.
Housing Auth., 120 Cal. App. 2d I, 260 P.2d 668 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
974 (1954) (the trial court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the housing authority to apply
the same set of standards in determining eligibility for all applicants).
31. See, e.g., Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955); Vann v.
Metropolitan Housing Auth., 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
32. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1141 (1969). In
the first major school desegregation case, the Supreme Court ruled that "school authorities have
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responsibility shifts to the courts only if the defendant fails to meet his
duty,:' and conditions demand the immediate implementation of a
court-adopted plan.
In the instant case, the court examined the evidence indicating the
defendant limited the number of Negro tenants in the four family
projects in predominantly white neighborhoods."4 Concluding that a
racial quota system was being used, the court held the plaintiffs were
entitled to an appropriate remedy against the defendant's tenant
assignment policies 5 The court then addressed itself to the procedures
used by the defendant in selecting sites for new projects. After
examining statistical information concerning site selection," the court
reasoned that racial discrimination was the only explanation for the
veto of more than 99.5 percent of the white sites initially selected for
housing projects, while only 10 percent of the units in Negro
neighborhoods were rejected during the same period.37 The court stated
that a deliberate policy to separate the races through discriminatory
selection of sites for new housing projects cannot be justified under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In granting relief,
the court -efused to enjoin the use of federal funds, contending this
would be a less efficient remedy than an affirmative order3
Four months after its decision, the court issued a judgment order
outlining a plan for integration of the public housing system and
the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems." Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). In Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968),
the Court held that the burden was on the school board to "come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work and promises realistically to work now."
33. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection.supra note 32, at 1141.
34. Almost 90% of the tenants in Chicago's public housing projects were Negroes, but
proportionally Negroes accounted for only 7%, 4%, 6% and 1% of the tenants in these four
projects.
35. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. III. 1969). In
rejecting defendant's contention that a history of tension, threats of violence, and violence could
excuse government-supported racial segregation, the court relied on Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
I (1958). The court indicated that a clear threat of violence might justify racial quotas as a
temporary expedient, but it found there had been only remote incidents of violence when Negroes
moved into white housing projects in Chicago. Id. at 909.
36. Of 41 sites in white neighborhoods initially selected for housing projects since 1955, only
2 were approved, both in 1966. One of the sites was located on vacant land bounded on one side
by a predominantely Negro area and partially occupied by dilapidated Negro shacks. The other
white site approved in 1966 was planned for 36 units. During the same period, 49 of 103 sites
initially selected in predominantly Negro areas were approved. Id. at 911.
37. Id. at 912.
38. The court noted that the Public Housing Administration has questioned the
appropriateness of cutting off federal funds. Also, the temporary denial of funds might impede
the development of public housing, thus damaging the persons for whose benefit the suit was
brought.
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permanently enjoining the defendant from discrimination. The court
directed the defendant housing authority to build its next 700 dwelling
units in white areas of the city, and thereafter to build 75 percent of
white
all new public housing projects in predominantly
neighborhoods. 0 The judgment order prohibits the defendant from
concentrating large numbers of dwelling units in or near a single
location. Except in special circumstances, a public housing project
cannot be designed for occupancy by more than 120 people" and
dwelling units for families with children cannot be provided above the
third story in any structure 2 The court also ordered the defendant to
adopt a revised tenant assignment plan, including a provision that no
more than 50 percent of the dwelling units in all public housing projects
can be made available to eligible neighborhood residents. The judgment
order requires the housing authority to file regular reports on its
activities and its progress in complying with the order.13 The court
stated it would retain jurisdiction in the case for all purposes, including
the issuance of new orders modifying or supplementing the judgment
order.
The instant case represents the first time a federal court has
adopted a specific and detailed formula to be followed by a local
housing aut-hor.ity in eliminating racial discrimination in public
housing. With its sweeping judgment order, this decision represents an
unequivocal commitment on the j art of the court to take positiveaction to insure that housing policies maintaining residential
segregation are no longer tolerated. In the past, despite legislative and
judicial mandates, public housing has had the effect of supporting
segregation" and separating low-income families from the rest of the
39.

Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., Civil No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill., filed July I,

1969).
40. Id. at 4. The court defined a predominantly white neighborhood as being within one
mile of census tracts which have 307 or more non-white population. Id. at 2.
41. In special cases, the court indicated a project may be designed for occupancy by as
many as 240 persons, id. at 5-6; but, in order to prevent large concentrations of public housing,
the court declared that new public housing projects cannot be built in census tracts where the
percentage of public housing would be more than 15% of the total number of apartments and

single-family residences in the tract. Id. at 6.
42. Dwelling units can be provided above the third story if the public housing units
comprise no more than 20% of the total number of apartments in the building. Id. at 6.
43. The reports must be filed with the court, the civil rights division of the Department of
Justice, and the regional administrator of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Id. at 7-9.
44. Grier, The Negro Ghettos and Federal Housing Polic. 32
551, 558 (1967).

LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.

1392

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL, 22

community! 5 By concentrating the poor into the ghettos, a critical gap

has grown between the needs of the people and the public resources to
deal with them.46 Under the court-adopted plan, these and other equally

serious problems should be at least partially eliminated. In addition to
providing for the integration of public housing projects, the court has
followed the recommendation of the Kerner Commission that the
traditional slum-based, high-rise public housing projects be changed to
small units on scattered sites outside the ghetto area.47 Consequently,

the court's judgment order, taken as a whole, will have significant
social effects far beyond the immediate goal of integrating public

housing. The court's plan should make a positive and direct
contribution to programs designed to achieve integration in the schools.
The plan also should increase employment opportunities for the poor,

since most new jobs are being created in suburbs and outlying areas

where the new units will be located."8 In addition, the environment in

public housing should become less impersonal and institutionalized.,'
Hopefully, the social changes resulting from the court's ruling will help

stem the nation's movement "toward two societies, one black, one
white-separate and unequal.

50

Integration in public housing projects

should help dispel current misconceptions concerning hostility that
results from commingling Negroes and whites,5 thus reducing the
52
amount of malevolence between the races.
Despite its positive aspects, several arguments can be advanced
against the judgment order. There undoubtedly will be concern that the

court abused its power and discretion in adopting such a comprehensive
45. Ledbetter, Public Housing-A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance. 32 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 490, 501 (1967).
46. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 260 (1968)

[hereinafter cited as

KERNER COMMISSION REPORT].

47. Id. at 257-63.
48. Id. at 217.
49. In 1965, the Chicago Daily News referred to a Chicago public housing project as a
"$70 Million Ghetto." The article said the project was an "all-Negro city within a city" and a
"civic monument to misery, bungling and a hellish way of life." Friedman, Public Housing and
the Poor: An Overview, 54 CAL. L. REV. 642, 644 (1966), citing Chicago Daily News, April 10,
1965, at I,col. I.
50. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 1.
51. After Negroes enter formerly all-white projects, personal interracial associations cause
prejudicial attitudes to diminish considerably. DEUTSCH & COLLINS, INTERRACIAL HOUSING: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT (1951); WILNER. WVACKLEY & COOK.
HUMAN RELATIONS IN INTERRACIAL HOUSING (1955), cited in Comment, supra note 8, at 887
n.77.
52. The Kerner Commission reported that the corrosive and degrading effect of forced
confinement of Negroes in segregated housing is at the center of the problem of racial disorder.
KERNER COMMISSION REPORT. supra note 46, at 91.
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plan, but courts have often found it necessary to issue detailed orders
to executive officials. Ending large concentrations of public housing
units may be questionable, since desegregation in tenant assignments
and site selection probably could be achieved without this provision.
Also, the scarcity and expense of land may not justify small, scattered
projects in metropolitan areas.5 3 The expense of such a diffused system
might make it impossible for the housing authority to abide by the
order without additional funds. Since little flexibility has been written
into the order, implementation may be extrerhely difficult, if not
impossible.5 4 However, such problems may be easily cured since the
court has indicated it will closely scrutinize implementation of the plan
and make any necessary modifications. Because of the relative
immobility of lower income families, construction of most new projects
outside the ghetto may have the adverse effect of denying adequate
housing to those with the greatest need. 55 The court apparently
reasoned that this immobility will be overcome when new housing
facilities become available in outlying areas.
Implementation of the judgment order will require a re-evaluation
of other government-sponsored programs in which public housing is
involved, such as model cities and urban renewal programs. Since local
land use planning regulations control the extent that low-cost housing
can be built in any particular location,." the order may cause conflicts
between the housing authority and the local zoning board. Althoughmany zoning devices have had the effect of restricting public housing
projects to certain areas,5 7 this court undoubtedly will strike down any
obstruction to implementation of its plan. Indeed, several courts
already have ruled against zoning devices designed to keep low-rent
housing projects from outlying residential areas. s Finally, the decision
may have the effect of increasing the fears of residents of white
53. Ledbetter, supra note 45, at 502.
54. The Chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority expressed doubts as to his ability to
implement the order. NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1969, at 74, col. 2; however, CHA's governing board
unanimously agreed not to appeal the court order. Chicago Tribune, July II, 1969, at I, col. 5.
55. The strongest justification for selection of sites in racially concentrated areas is that
such areas are in desperate need of public housing projects because a large proportion of existing
housing is seriously substandard. Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964-Iniplementationand Impact. 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 8i4, 999 (1968).
56. Grinstead, Overcoming Barriers to Scattered-Site Low-Cost Housing, 2 PROSPEcTuS
327, 329 (1969).
57. These devices include minimum' lot size requirements, density zoning, frontage
requirements, single family restrictions, and minimum living space requirements. Id.
58. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969); Ranjel v. City of
Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich. 1969); Grinstead, supra note 56, at 336.

1394

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 22

neighborhoods who have opposed public housing in the past because
of the possibility that it would bring racial integration 5 If opponents

gain enough support, the very future of the housing program, which
depends on public funds for its existence, could be threatened."

In balance, however, the failure of past legislative and judicial
efforts to achieve desegregation of public housing facilities indicates the
court was justified in developing its broad integration formula.
Generally, legislative remedies are more effective than court-ordered
remedies, and legislators and administrators usually are more
competent to draft comprehensive plans to attack specific problems.
But until the government agencies administering the housing program
are willing to develop and implement comprehensive and effective

desegregation plans on their own, there may be no alternative to strict
judicial supervision if integration in public housing facilities is to
occur.61
Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy-Fifth Amendment's
Guarantee against Double Jeopardy is Applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment
Petitioner was acquitted of a larceny charge but convicted of

burglary in a Maryland state court and sentenced to ten years
imprisonment. On appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals, the case

was remanded because both the grand and petit juries had been
unconstitutionally selected,' and petitioner elected to be reindicted and

retried.2 At a second trial for both larceny and burglary, the court
59. See Special Project- Public Housing. supra note 8, at 900-01.
60. The editorial voice of The Chicago Tribune criticized the court's judgment order, saying
"the present muddle shows it would be entirely desirable if the government could be cleared out
of housing entirely." Chicago Tribune, July 3, 1969, at 12, col. 2.
61. The instant case already has been followed by at least one court holding that Negroes
have the right to have public housing project sites selected without regard to the racial
composition of the neighborhood. Hicks v. weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969). (The court
enjoined the Department of Housing and Urban Development from making further payments of
funds to the local housing authority for a project in an all-Negro neighborhood).
I. Petitioner's appeal was filed shortly after the case of Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121,
213 A.2d 475 (1965), had invalidated a section of the Maryland Constitution requiring jurors to
swear their belief in God.
2. Petitioner was given the option of retaining the burglary conviction or being retried under
a new indictment.
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overruled petitioner's objection that retrial on the larceny count, of
which he had previously been acquitted, was a violation of the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Petitioner was found
guilty on both counts 'and given concurrent sentences of fifteen years

for burglary and five years for larceny. The Maryland Court of Special
Appeals rejected petitioner's double jeopardy claim on the merits,

holding that an invalid indictment will 'not support a double jeopardy
plea; 3 the Court of Appeals denied discretionary review. On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The double

jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784

(1969).
The principle that a man cannot twice be put in jeopardy for the

same offense' can be traced to its Greek and Roman origins5 and is
deeply entrenched in English common law.' The prohibition is
preserved in the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United
States 7 and in most state constitutions.8 Although early case law
intimated that the double jeopardy clause applied to the states, 9 the

Supreme Court indicated that the fifth amendment pertained only to
federal proceedings and did not limit state action.10 Prior to 1937,

divergent state double jeopardy standards developed largely because the
3. Benton v. Maryland, I Md. App. 647, 232 A.2d 542 (1967).
4. Although courts have differed in their determination of when one has been placed "twice
in jeopardy," Sigler, Federal Double Jeopardy Policy, 19 VAND. L. REv. 375, 377-78 (1966), there
seems to be general agreement that the objectives of the policy are to prevent unnecessary
harassment, to avoid the social stigma incident to repeated criminal trials, to conserve time and
money, to equalize the grossly unequal adversary capabilities of the state and defendant, and to
preserve psychological security. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957);
United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Comment, Statutory
Implementation of DoubleJeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund ConstitutionalGuarantee,
65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
5. See J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-37 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SIGLER].
6. Blackstone noted that there had developed "this universal maxim of the common law
of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once, for the same
offense." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 335. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150-55
(1959) (dissenting opinion).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or shall any-person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
8. See Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 435 n.6 (1953) (dissenting opinion); SIGLER,
supra note 5, at 78-79.
9. State v. Moor, I Miss. 134 (1823). "It was properly admitted in argument, that this
provision of the Constitution was binding in the United States, as well as the state courts of the
Union, for I take it, it has never been questioned, but that the Constitution of the United States
is the paramount law of the land, any law usage or custom of the several states to the contrary
notwithstanding. Id. at 138. Contra, Phillips v. McCauley, 92 F.2d 790 (1937).
10. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
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Supreme Court was never confronted with a factual situation which it
chose to term double jeopardy. Since no double jeopardy issue was
recognized, it was unnecessary to determine whether the double
jeopardy, guarantee extended to the states." In 1937, the Supreme

Court in Palko v. Connecticut 2 held that the fourteenth amendment
did not extend the fifth amendment's guarantee against double
jeopardy to the states. On the other hand, Palko did not repudiate the

possibility of situations in which the fourteenth amendment would
prevent the states from imposing double jeopardy." The Palko ruling
sanctioned a multiplicity of solutions to the problem of double

jeopardy, permitting each state to develop a standard" while the federal
courts developed another.'5 Since Palko, there has been a Supreme
II. Even when squarely presented with the issue, the Court avoided the double jeopardy
question. See, e.g., Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900); accord, Dreyer v. Illinois.
187 U.S. 71 (1902) (defendant was not denied due process when his conviction was set aside and
he was later retried for the same offense). See also Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1910) (state
could permit a new trial for murder after an appealed conviction of manslaughter had been
reversed); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909) (discharge of jury results in mistrial, and the
accused cannot on subsequent trial interpose the plea of once in jeopardy): Shoener v.
Pennsylvania, 207 U.S. 188 (1907) (defendant is not put in double jeopardy if the indictment
under which he is tried is so radically defective that it will not support a judgment).
12. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and upon retrial
after state appeal was found guilty of first degree murder.
13. States do not enjoy carte blanche with respect to reprosecution. Palko held that due
process is violated when the jeopardy to which the defendant is subjected is "shocking," and it
appears that a sufficiently flagrant example of harassment or multiple punishment would be
deemed a violation of due process. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 429 (1953) (concurring
opinion).
14. The states have developed their own versions of double jeopardy policy with some states
giving more effect to double jeopardy policies than do the federal norms, while other states give
less. Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1272, 1287 (1964).
The validity of the Palko decision influenced the Court to accord states continued broad
discretion. E.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (state judges may impose more
severe sentences on retrial when factual data supporting the more severe sentence is present);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (state conviction after federal acquittal does not violate
the fourteenth amendment); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), and Ciucci v. Illinois, 356
U.S. 571 (1958) (states are not forbidden by the fourteenth amendment from prosecuting different
offenses at consecutive trials even though they arise out of the same occurrence); Brock v. North
Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953) (retrial for the same offense after a first trial had been interrupted
by the refusal of two of the state's witnesses to give testimony does not violate due process).
Louisiana ecx rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (the issuance of a new death warrant
subsequent to the failure of an execution attempt pursuant to a death penalty was held not to
infringe the double jeopardy guarantee); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (a prisoner whose
conviction is reversed by the state supreme court may be indicted and tried again).
15. The federal standard incorporated the following general rules: (I) A verdict of acquittal
is final, United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). (2) The government may not secure a new
trial by means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous, Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). (3) The defendant is placed in jeopardy once he is put to

1969]

RECENT CASES

1397

Court trend toward selective incorporation of the specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights into the protections of the fourteenth amendment.,6
Although the Court has continued to reject the incorporation argument
in double jeopardy cases,1 7 several courts have assumed that the
commands of the fifth amendment were binding on the states.8 The
Second Circuit was the first court to hold that the federal double
jeopardy standards were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment
and applied to the states.'9 Duncan v. Louisiana" raised the most
serious challenge to the Palko decision when it noted that the approach
used in Palko to determine whether a right is "fundamental" and
"essential to a fair trial" was not the approach used by recent courts
in making the same determination 2
In the instant case, the Court found that Palko v. Connecticut was
based on an approach to constitutional rights which had been rejected
in the Court's most recent decisions. Noting that a number of cases
relied upon in the Palko decision had been overruled, 22 the Court
trial and a jury is sworn, so that if the jury is discharged without his consent, he cannot be tried
again, Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Kepner v. United States, supra. (4) If unforeseeable.
circumstances arise, making a verdict impossible, the defendant may be retried because his
jeopardy is not regarded as having come to an end, Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
(5) After a successful appeal, defendant may not be retried for a greater offense than that for
which he was originally convicted, id. (6) Federal courts may not retry one who has been tried in
the courts of another nation, United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). (7) After
a state trial for the same offense, federal courts may prosecute one who has violated both state
and federal laws, United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). (8) Judges may not impose
multiple punishments for the same criminal act. See. e.g., Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1
(1926). See generally Sigler, Federal Double Jeopardy Policy, 19 VAND. L. REv. 375, 384-85
(1966)..
16. These rights include: the fourth amendment provisions against unreasonable searches
and seizures and the exclusion of illegally seized evidence, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
the sixth amendment right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); the right to a
speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); the right to confrontation of
witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); the compulsory process for obtaining witnesses,
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); the right to trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968).
17. See Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
18. See People v. Laws, 29 IIl. 2d 221, 193 N.E.2d 806 (1963); People v. Henderson, 60
Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677 (1963).
19. United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965).
20. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is a fundamental right
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
21. Id. at 149-50 n.14. The Palko approach was to ask if any "civilized system could be
imagined that would not accord the particular protection." The more recent approach is to
determine if such a "procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty."
22. The Court's decision in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), that the fifth
amendment guarantee against self-incrimination did not extend to the states, was overruled in
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expressly overruled Palko v. Connecticut and rejected the notion that
the fourteenth amendment applied against the states only when the
jeopardy to which the defendant was subjected was "a hardship so
acute and shocking" that society could not tolerate it. The Court,
recognizing that the guarantee against double jeopardy is deeply rooted
in the Anglo-American system of justice, concluded that the double
jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment represents a fundamental
right and should apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Considering whether petitioner's conviction was a violation of the
federal double jeopardy standard, the Court stated that petitioner was
forced to suffer retrial for larceny in order to appeal his burglary
conviction and that such a procedure violated the guarantee against
double jeopardy as formulated in Green v. United States 3 Moreover,
the Court rejected the state's argument that the indictment was
absolutely void and ruled that the indictment was voidable only at
defendant's option. Relying upon United States v. Ball,2 4 the Court
held that the government could not allege its own error to deprive the
defendant of the benefit of an acquittal by jury. The majority held that
petitioner had a valid double jeopardy plea which he could not be
forced to waive, and that the larceny conviction could not stand.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Harlan asserted that by failing to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, the Court had disregarded the well-established
principle that constitutional questions should be considered only when
absolutely necessary. Mr. Justice Harlan further stated that selective
incorporation has no support in history or reason and concluded that
the case could have been decided with the same result using the Palko
rationale 5
The instant Court has taken a significant step toward the goal of
fundamental fairness in state criminal proceedings. Incorporation of
the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy and the
overruling of Palko marked the demise of the outdated approach to
constitutional liberties which required that they be preserved only in
cases of shocking state action. The Court's decision was a logical
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Palko Court also relied on West v. Louisiana, 194
U.S. 258 (1904), which refused to apply the sixth amendment right to confrontation of witnesses
to the states. West was overruled in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See Comment, Double
Jeopardy:Its History, Rationaleand Future, 70 DIcK. L. REV. 377 (1966).
23. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). "[C]onditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced surrender

of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with
the constitutional bar against double jeopardy." 395 U.S. at 796.
24. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
25. 395 U.S. at 801 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Stewart joined in the dissent.
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extension of the recent trend toward total incorporation and had been
considered inevitable by numerous commentators.2 The immediate
result of Benton will be to relieve defendants of the necessity of
gambling with their futures by conditioning an appeal on the forced

surrender of a lesser sentence or an acquittal. Benton, combined with
North Carolina v. Pearce,27 will protect the successful criminal

appellant from the often harsher sentence which may follow a second
trial, and will act as a deterrent to the discretionary powers of the

prosecutor who has numerous criminal charges upon which to base a
prosecution 8 The case may result in a re-examination of successive
municipal-state and state-federal prosecutions for the same offense,

such as occur, for example, under federal and state marijuana laws

9

Now that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
applicable to the states, it will become necessary to re-examine federal
decisional law in order to determine which rules are constitutionally
compelled and which are merely the result of the supervisory power of
the federal courts 0 In view of the Court's recent imposition of federal
fourth amendment interpretations upon the states, it is unlikely that the

Court would exercise restraint in the double jeopardy context3

The

problem of determining whether one has been subjected to double

jeopardy has led to numerous divergent conclusions, and the result of
a plea of double jeopardy is usually in doubt.

2

Therefore, it would have

been beneficial for the Court to discuss in greater detail the criteria
used in reaching its holding that petitioner had twice been put in
26. See Justice Marshall's opinion in United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d
844 (1965); SIGLER, supra note 5, at 50; Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth
Amendinent, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 80-81 (1963); Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties
and the "Successful" CriminalAppellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 636 (1965).
27. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). State judges may impose more severe sentences on retrial, but the
due process clause requires that judges set forth factual data supporting the increased penalty.
28. See SIGLER, supra note 5, at 187. Another possible outgrowth of this decision may be
an increased splitting of offenses, resulting from the extension to the states of the prohibition
against the state's appeal and retrial of an erroneous verdict. Such splitting of offenses would
increase the state's chances of prosecution. See, e.g., Jones, What Constitutes Double Jeopardy?,
38 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 379, 384-90 (1947); Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and
Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. i, 14 (1960).
29. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Gross,
Successive Prosecution by City and State, 43 ORE. L.'REV. 281 (1964); Kneier, Prosecution Under
State Law and Municipal Ordinance as Double Jeopardy, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 201 (193 1).
30. See Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1289
(1964); Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963).
31. Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1289

(1964).
32.

Sigler, supra note 4, at 378.
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jeopardy. By relying on Green, however, the Court could be deemed to

have endorsed the Green approach of considering the particular factual
situation in relation to the underlying policy considerations 3 The

concept of double jeopardy will require considerable clarification and
elucidation in future opinions, and this may overburden the federal
courts since double jeopardy is a commonly claimed defense 4 Drastic
legislative revision of criminal statutes and case law may be required
to reconcile the divergent state and federal standards, 35 but, regardless

of the approach used by legislatures or courts, it is apparent that a
uniform national policy concerning what constitutes double jeopardy
has been initiated. It is hoped that the new national standard will
remove the inconsistencies from double jeopardy law and thereby

increase its significance as a constitutional protection.
Constitutional Law-Garnishment-Prejudgment Wage
Garnishment, in Absence of Conditions Requiring the Special
Protection of a State or Creditor Interest, Violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
An action was initiated' by the respondent finance corporation
against the petitioner garnishing a portion of petitioner's wages before

trial of the principal suit? The petitioner moved that the garnishment
proceedings be dismissed on the grounds that the Wisconsin

prejudgment garnishment procedure was unconstitutional for failure to
satisfy the procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment. The respondent contended that the procedure did not
33. The underlying idea of the fifth amendment's protection against double jeopardy *is
that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment expense
and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
34. See SIGLER, supra note 5, at 225.
35. "As it is now the outcome of a double jeopardy plea in the federal courts is not always
predictable. Even where it is relatively certain, the legal rule seems often unrelated to any
conscious goal. History will not cure the deficiencies of law. The social policy of double jeopardy
requires a more conscious consideration by Congress and the federal courts," SIGLER. supra note
5, at 75-76.
I. The action was filed in accordance with Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment procedure:
§§ 267.02, 267.05, 267.07 (Supp. 1969).
2. Respondent's garnishment action was ancillary to an action brought to collect damages
from petitioner for default on a promissory note.
Wis. STAT. ANN.
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involve a final determination of the title of petitioner's property, and,
since the due process requirements of notice and a hearing would be

fulfilled before the petitioner was permanently deprived of her property,
prejudgment garnishment was constitutionally permissible. The trial

court's ruling upheld the constitutionality of the procedure, and the
Circuit Court of Milwaukee County affirmed. Upon appeal the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed both decisions.3 On certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. In the absence of
conditions requiring the special protection of a state or creditor

interest, prejudgment garnishment procedures providing for the interim
attachment of a debtor's wages without notice or a hearing violate the

due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Although the origins of garnishment and attachment can be traced

to medieval England' and colonial America, garnishment and
attachment today are entirely statutory remedies.6 Since prejudgment

garnishment was an outgrowth of attachment, the two actions are quite
similar. When used prior to adjudication of-the principal suit both
proceedings are creditor remedies, which involve an involuntary
dispossession of the defendant-debtor. The two remedies, however, are
distinguishable. First, an attachment seizes the debtor's property which

is in his possession, whereas garnishment seizes funds, effects, and
credits belonging to the defendant which are in the possession of a third

person. Although the purposes of the remedies are identical-to obtain
3. Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court based its decision on the following grounds: (I) Since prejudgment garnishment
does not involve any final determination of title to property, defendant suffered no constitutional
deprivations because her property was temporarily attached pending final determination of the
principal suit. (2) There was no denial of the due process requirement of a prior hearing since,
independently of the statute, potential abuses of prejudgment garnishment were subject to judicial
review before trial of the principal action. (3) The defendant had no standing to attack the
constitutionality of the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute on grounds based on injustices
and deprivations which have been or are likely to be suffered by others, but which she had not
personally experienced. (4) There was no denial of equal protection of the law because the statutes
apply to all debtors.
4. In the Middle Ages garnishment originated as the offspring of "'foreign attachment," a
process designed to provide an action against non-resident merchants whereby their property,
which was under the control of a third party, was seized. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 387 (3d ed. 1923).
5. B. MORRIS. SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITN 1674-1784, at
19 (1934). For a detailed history of the development of garnishment in medieval England and
the United States, see Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MINN. L. REV.
1,7-10 (1942).
6. See Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934).

1402

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 22

the debtor's property as security for an anticipated judgment-the

rationale behind their use differs. Attachment serves a dual
functiont-to gain jurisdiction' and to avoid the perpetration of fraud.

Garnishment, however, does not primarily serve either of these
functions.1 0 Its chief importance is as a collection device', that

frequently avoids adjudication of the principal suit. Despite the out-ofcourt settlements which result from a threat of wage garnishment, there
has been a significant increase in the number of wage garnishment

actions 2 because of expansion of consumer credit.

Accompanying

wage garnishment are serious social and economic consequences, such

as termination of employment, loss of income, and bankruptcy."
Although prejudgment garnishment and attachment in theory conflict
with the procedural requisites of notice 5 and hearing," the courts that
have considered the due process issue have concluded that these
7. Comment, Attachment and Garnishnient-Prejudgnent Garnishnentl-Study and
ProposedRevisions, 9 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 119, 120 (1969).
8. Attachment most often is used to seize the property of a non-resident debtor, thereby
forcing him either to appear and defend his property, or default both the suit and the property.
Attachment of real.property, an in rem procedure, confers jurisdiction on the court. Id. at 120.
9. Attachment prevents fraudulent concealment or disposal of the property. Id.
10. The garnishment procedure is not used as a means to obtain jurisdiction. Garnishment
is an in personam action (e.g., Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Hundley, 118 A.2d 515 (D.C.
Mun. App. 1955)) whereby personal jurisdiction must be obtained over the garnishee. In addition,
garnishment is seldom used to prevent fraud for it is quite unlikely that a wage earner would leave
his job and the state in order to protect a portion of his salary. Comment, supra note 7, at 120.
11. Faced with the threat of wage garnishment, many debtors hasten to settle their accounts
outside of court, often having to enter into a new payment contract which incorporates additional
charges. The threat of wage garnishment, therefore, collects more money than the amount
collected through the use of the remedy in court. Note, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An
EmpiricalStudy, 43 WAsH. L. REV. 743, 749 (1968).
12. In Chicago, the Cook County Circuit Court issued 84,513 garnishments in 1965, an
increase of 15% over 1964 and 72% over 1961. Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1966, at I, col.
6. The San Francisco sheriffs office made more than 5,900 services in the first 2 months of 1965,
including 3,700 levies under writs of attachment and execution-of which 75% to 80% were wage
garnishments. Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California:A Study and Recommendations, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 1214 (1965). In 1964, the Seattle District Justice Court processed 12,280 writs of
garnishment. This number increased to 14,332 in 1965, and to 15,624 in 1966. About 85% of these
were wage garnishments. Note, supra note 1I, at 744 & n.7.
13. In 1955, consumer installment debt was $29 billion. By 1965, that figure had increased
by almost 44%, to $66 billion. At the current rate of growth, it is estimated that in 1970
installment debt will approach $100 billion. See D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE xvi (1967).
14. Note, Wage GarnishmentAs a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 759, 760-62.
15. E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950): "This
right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and
can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."
16. See, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914): "The fundamental requisite of
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."
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remedies do not violate due process of law. In Mclnnes v. McKay 7 the

court stated that prejudgment attachment is not a deprivation of
property as contemplated in the Constitution because there is no
deprivation of title and the deprivation is temporary and conditioned
upon a process which gives notice to the debtor and provides him with
an opportunity to be heard." The court's reluctance to address the due
process issue may be attributed to the established constitutional
doctrine that when justified by compelling public interest, one may be

deprived of his property by summary action subject to later judicial
review of its validity. 9 Since the creditor interest served by wage
garnishment affects the public, the deprivation, under the above
doctrine, may be justified. 20 Although this argument is of relatively
recent origin, similar considerations influenced the Supreme Court's

decisions in two prior cases 2 '
In the instant case the Court noted that the sole question for
decision was whether there had been a deprivation of petitioner's
property without due process. 2 The Court found that the Wisconsin
prejudgment garnishment procedure deprived the petitioner of her
property without sufficient notice or hearing, and that this case
presented no special circumstances, such as those requiring the

protection of a state or creditor interest, which would justify the
deprivation. The majority further found that the Wisconsin statute was

not narrowly drawn to meet any such special situations. The Court,
17. 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699, affd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1928). The Supreme Court
affirmed on the authority of Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), which upheld a Delaware
statute conditioning the appearance of a non-resident debtor to defend his attached property on
the posting of a bond equal in value to the property attached, and Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277
U.S. 29 (1928), which approved the placement of a lien, without prior hearing, on the property
of stockholders of an insolvent bank.
18. The Supreme Court of Appeals of. West Virginia used this same reasoning, citing
Mclnnes as supporting authority. Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932).
19. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442-43 (1944); cj. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332
U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519-21 (1944); North American
Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320 (1908).
20. The argument has been made that it is in the public interest that wage garnishment be
maintained as a viable creditor remedy. The proponents of this position contend that the
immediate effect of a restriction on wage garnishment would be an increase in the number of
uncollectable debts, thus forcing creditors to restrict the granting of credit by eliminating marginal
risks. This in turn would have an adverse effect on the economy by reducing the number of sales.
This argument, however, is not conclusive, and there is some evidence that credit extension is
unrelated to wage garnishment. Note, supra note 11, at 771-72.
21. See note 17supra.
22. See note 3 supra. The Wisconsin Supreme Court holding was based on the
determination of several issues, whereas the Court in the instant case found it necessary to
consider only one issue.
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noting that this case dealt with a specialized type of property presenting
distinct problems, 23 rejected the respondent's contention that the rule
derived from Mclnnes was applicable to prejudgment wage
garnishment. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Wisconsin

prejudgment garnishment procedure, in the absence of justifying
circumstances, was unconstitutional as a deprivation of property
without due process of law.24

The Court's decision not to eliminate prejudgment wage
garnishment, but only to limit its use to certain situations, represents
a compromise between the debtor's due process rights and the

creditor's interest in collecting unpaid accounts. While the instant case
does represent a distinct break with the precedents of the last 40 years

that have upheld prejudgment wage garnishment, the holding will not
fulfill the Court's manifest desire

'

to eliminate the injustices and

hardships associated with prejudgment wage garnishment. Although
substantial changes will be required in those states whose statutes are

similar to the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statutes, 6 the effect
of the changes may be diminished by the Court's failure to specify the7
standards by which the states are to revise their garnishment statutes

Without specific criteria the trial courts will be left to their own
judgment to determine whether a state's garnishment procedure has
23. 395 U.S. at 340-42. The Court noted some of the social and economic consequences or
prejudgment wage garnishment-termination of employment, loss of income often resulting in
bankruptcy, and unscrupulous practices of many creditors.
24. In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Harlan, pointing out the precise basis on which he
joined the majority, stated that the "'property" of which petitioner had been deprived was the
use of the garnished portion of her wages. This deprivation could not be characterized as de
mininimis; therefore, procedural due process was required. He further found that thb due process
requirements of notice and hearing had not been satisfied, even though the petitioner had been
notified simultaneously with the garnishee and would receive a hearing before being permanently
deprived of her property.
In dissent Mr. Justice Black expressed his opinion that the Court's holding was based solely
on the view that prejudgment wage garnishment was bad state policy and an inhumane doctrine.
He pointed out that such judgments were for the state legislatures to make, not this Court, and
concluded that the Court's holding amounted to a judicial usurpation of state legislative power.
25. In its opinion the Court went to considerable length to show the socio-economic
problems created by prejudgment wage garnishment. 395 U.S. at 340.
26. The states with statutes similar to the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment law are:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. The statutes in at least three other states are
questionable: Arkansas, New Mexico, and Wyoming.
27. The cases cited by the Court in support of the position that summary procedures will
be approved in some cases and rejected in others do not adequately illuminate the distinction
between the interests involved to provide a standard by which to judge the constitutionality of
any revised statutes. 395 U.S. at 339.
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met the broad mandate of the instant case. Appropriate standards
could have been set forth by adopting the conditions requiring special
protection that are embodied in the state statutes approved by the
Court2 Because situations requiring the special protection of a state
or creditor interest justify prejudgment garnishment, the states whose
statutes are drawn to meet these special circumstances will be
unaffected.P Changes brought about by this decision '0 will only modify,
not eliminate,, prejudgment wage garnishment. The problems which
exist under the present procedures will still exist under revised
procedures conforming to the mandate of the instant case.* Thus the
Court has taken only one step in the direction of eliminating the harsh
effects of prejudgment garnishment. Not even complete prohibition of
prejudgment wage garnishment will eliminate the injustices and
hardships mentioned earlier because they are also created by postjudgment garnishment.2 Thus, to eliminate these problems would
require the complete prohibition of all wage garnishment?3: Although
no judicial or legislative body has gone this far, the recent trend has
been to place restrictions on wage garnishment. State legislatures
throughout the country have been unusually active in amending
garnishment statutes3 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, which has
been enacted in only Oklahoma and Utah, prohibits prejudgment wage
garnishment, but allows post-judgment garnishment of a limited
portion of the debtor's wages.-*" After extensive committee hearings and
28. Typical conditions justifying prejudgment garnishments are: (1) The debtor or defendant
resides out of state; or (2) he is about to remove, or he has removed himself or property from
the state; or (3) he conceals himself so the ordinary process of law cannot be served upon him;
or (4) he fraudulently disposes of or is about to fraudulently dispose of his property; or (5) the
debtor or defendant is a foreign corporation. The Court, by mentioning that Wisconsin's statute
was not drawn to meet any such unusual conditions, inferred that those state statutes which are
so drawn meet the requisites of due process. See 395 U.S. at 339.

29. 2 CCH CONSUMwER CREDIT GUIDE 99,904 (1969).
30. The changes most likely to be incorporated into the existing garnishment statutes are
similar to those cited in note 28 supra. For a writ of garnishment to be issued before judgment
on the principal suit, the creditor will be required to satisfy one of the conditions.
31. Even when prejudgment wage garnishment is justified on grounds of protection of a
state or creditor interest, the debtor's wages still will be garnished, resulting in loss of income,
possible termination of employment, possible bankruptcy, and often new payment contracts
incorporating additional charges.
32.
33.

Note, supra note 14.
Kerr, Wage Garnishment Should Be Eliminated, 2 PROSPEcTus 371 (1969). The author

vigorously states his belief that prohibition of wage garnishment will be the only solution to the
problems created by wage garnishment.
34. Note, supra note II, at 744 n.9.
35.

UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE

§§ 5.104, 5.105.

1406

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

22

several compromises, 31 Congress enacted as part of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, a provision which establishes a maximum
percentage of wages subject to garnishment and forbids the discharge
of employees because of garnishment. 7 The instant case represents a
continuation of this trend, and because of the importance which
historically has been attached to Supreme Court decisions, it may serve
as the impetus for further and more significant restrictions on wage
garnishment.

Constitutional Law-State Taxation-State Use Tax Invalidly
Applied to Fuel Gas Used as an Integral Part of Interstate
Commerce
Complainants, three foreign corporations engaged in the operation
of interstate natural gas pipe lines,' were assessed use tax deficiencies
by the State of Tennessee for failure to account for the value of gas
used in operating compressors that transport the gas along their lines.'
After paying the taxes under protest, complainants brought suits to
recover, contending that the imposition of the use tax contravened a
Tennessee statute which exempted interstate commerce from taxation3
36. The original House Bill (H.R. 11601, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967)) provided a blanket
prohibition against wage garnishment, and the Senate Bill (S. 5. 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967))
had no provision dealing with garnishment. The House Bill was sent to the House Committee on
Banking and Currency which reported out a Bill that restricted wage garnishment to 10% of gross
earnings in excess of $30 per week. The committee's hearings brought out the urgent need for
some basic regulation of wage garnishment; at the same time, however, it was clear that the
creditor must have some instrument of last resort for collecting legitimate debts. The Bill reported
out was offered and generally supported by the minority as being a reasonable compromise of a
very complex problem. This Bill was sent to a Senate-House conference from which emerged Title
III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
37. Consumer Credit Protection Act §§ 303-04, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
I. All three corporations own and operate natural gas pipe lines which originate in
Louisiana and Texas, traverse Tennessee, and extend into the northern and eastern states, The
pipe lines transport natural gas in continuous flow from the gathering points in Louisiana and
Texas to delivery points outside of Tennessee.
2. As part of the transportation system, complainants operate compressor stations along
their lines in Tennessee. The stations are essential to maintain the pressure that propels the natural
gas to its ultimate destination. The compressors consist of engines which consume natural gas
drawn from the mains.
3. "It is not the intention of this chapter to levy a tax upon articles of tangible personal
property imported into this state or produced or manufactured in this state for export; nor is it
the intention of this chapter to levy a tax on bona ide interstate commerce. It is, however, the
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and that the tax constituted a burden upon interstate commerce within
the prohibition of the commerce clause. The Commissioner argued that
the fuel gas ceased to be in interstate commerce when it was diverted
from the mains and its use was taxable.4 The Chancery Court,
Davidson County, Tennessee, held that the consumption of the gas in
the compressors was an integral part of interstate commerce and
granted each complainant the relief sought On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, held, affirmed. Natural gas used as an integral
part of interstate commerce in the operation of interstate pipe line
compressors does not come to rest in the state and is exempted from
state use taxes. Benson v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 444 S.W.2d
137 (Tenn. 1969).
States lack the power to tax the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce.' Consequently, state privilege taxes7 cannot be validly
applied to privileges or activities regarded as an integral part of that
commerce. 8 In Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky,9 the United States
Supreme Court held that the prohibition of the commerce clause
invalidated state taxation upon the use of a medium by which interstate
transportation is effected. Subsequently, the Court has upset a number
of state privilege taxes imposed upon the use of supplies and equipment
intention of this chapter to levy a tax on the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the
distribution, and the storage to be used or consumed in this state of tangible personal property.
after it has come to rest in this state and has become a part of the mass of property in this state."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3007 (1956).
4. The gas is withdrawn from the mains which run through the stations; it is metered and
run through pipes to pressure regulators, then to the engines. The State contended that a taxable
moment occurred during the interval of time from separation from the mains to consumption in
the engines.
5. The suits were consolidated for trial. The Chancellor was of the opinion that "as a
matter of fact and logic" the consumption was an integral part of the interstate transportation
system and any tax assessed thereon was an invalid burden under the commerce clause. Texas
Gas Transmission Corp. v. Benson, No. 89725 (Ch. Ct. Davidson Cty., Tenn. Oct. 24, 1968).
6. The doctrine is based upon the postulate that the privilege is given by the national
government and not by the state governments. E.g., Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Atlantic & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160
(1903).
7. The term privilege tax as used in this comment is a generic one, encompassing all taxes
for the privilege of engaging in certain activities. The term includes excise, franchise, occupation,
license, and use taxes.
8. "It is now well settled that a tax imposed on a local activity related to interstate
commerce is valid if, and only if, the local activity is not such an integral part of the interstate
process, the flow of commerce, that it cannot realistically be separated from it." MichiganWisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954).
9. 279 U.S. 245 (1929). Kentucky attempted to tax all gasoline used within the state.
Helson, an Illinois resident, did an exclusively interstate ferry business between Kentucky and
Illinois. The gas used to furnish the motive power was purchased outside of Kentucky, although
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actually employed in conducting interstate business."' Later
developments in cases of state privilege taxation reflect a limitation on
the zone of tax immunity provided by Helson and a greater awareness
by the Court of the needs of the states for revenue." The distinction

between taxable and nontaxable activities or events has been made to
depend on whether the activity is an attribute of the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce or of a local privilege. One criterion

employed by the Court in making this determination has been the
chronological relationship of the taxable event with the interstate
movement-whether the tax was imposed on an activity conducted
before the movement started, after it had ended, or during some stages

of the movement' 2 The principles of Helson have no applicability to
state privilege taxes on the use of articles that have not begun to move
interstate

3

or have ended their interstate journey." However, the

Supreme Court has uniformly denied the competence of the states to
tax the use of articles in continuous interstate transit."' When the

interstate transit is interrupted, the Court has had difficulty in deciding
the validity of local privilege taxes; under certain circumstances there
may be a taxable moment before transportation is resumed." In
75'e of it actually was used there. The Kentucky tax, as applied to the use or the gasoline, was
held to be invalid as a direct burden upon the privilege of using an instrumentality of interstate
commerce.

10. Bingaman v. Golden Eagle W. Lines, Inc., 297 U.S. 626 (1936) (tax upon the
importation and use of gasoline in interstate motor carrier invalid); Cooney v. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935) (striking down tax on telephones used in interstate
communications).
11. One writer argues that the authority of Helson is doubtful and another suggests that
the case has been substantially overruled. See Brown, The Future of Use Taxes. 8 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 495, 496 (1941); Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate C'omnmerce. 52 HARV.
L. Riv. 617 (1939).
12. P. HARTMAN. STATI / TAXATION OFINTERSTATE COM\IERCIi 99 (1953).
13. Practical continuity of manufacture or production with interstate transportation has not
prevented the imposition of non-discriminatory privilege taxes. Eg., Utah Power & Light Co, v.
Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) (license tax on manufacture, generation, or production of electricity
upheld); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) (upholding privilege tax on
production of gas sold interstate).
14. Compare Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937) (gas
transported interstate and sold subject to tax on ground it had lost its interstate character) and
East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 283 U.S. 465 (1931) (gas transported interstate and sold to
consumers held to have lost its interstate character) with State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Nat.
Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931) (where interstate gas had not yet lost its tax immunity).
15. See Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota. 272 U.S. 469 (1926); Champlain Realty
Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922). The cases cited involved property taxation but contain
analogous principles.
16. Hartman, State Taxation of lnterstate Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA.
L. Ri-v. 1051, 1089 (1960); see. e.g.. Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665 (1913)
(discussion of taxable moment for property taxation).
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Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace,17 state storage and withdrawal
taxes were upheld after the Court found that a break in transit caused
the property to rest within the state for a taxable moment. The purpose
of the interruption has been regarded by the Court as the crucial
question in determining the existence of a taxable moment.18 When the
journey comes to a halt for the owner's business reasons, the commerce
clause does not immunize the commerce from privilege taxation.,' Once
business reasons have been established, even practical continuity of
movement does not preclude a taxable moment. ' " A second criterion
used by the Court in discerning taxability has been the geographical
nature of the taxable event-whether there is present some local activity
which may serve as a taxable privilege. Taxes that have as an operative
incident any local activity which the Court considers separate and
distinct from the flow of commerce have been validated. 2' Many
localized aspects of interstate cqmmerce, although indispensable to
such commerce and not amounting to intrastate commerce, have been
22
held to afford a sufficient predicate for the imposition of state taxes.
The Supreme Court has upheld a privilege tax on the production of
mechanical power used by a pipe line company to operate its
17. 288 U.S. 249 (1933). Tennessee levied a tax on the storage of gasoline within the state
and its withdrawal for sale or use. The taxpayer argued that the tax was on the use of gasoline
in taxpayer's business as an interstate carrier.
18. See Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886) (the first enunciation of this method of analysis),
P.HARTIAN. supra note 12, at 138.
19. If commerce has come to rest within the state at the pleasure of the owner, for his
disposal or use, the state has a taxable grip during the pause. E.g.. Independent Warehouses, Inc.
v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947) (sustaining tax even though business reason was the impossibility
of carrying on business any other way). A mere temporary interruption to facilitate interstate
transportation or for the purpose of convenience and safety does not permit taxation. E.g.. Kelley
v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903) (sheep grazing held a necessary incident of method of travel).
20. The Court has sustained state taxes on storage and use when there was a very brief
interval after the articles had reached the end of an interstate trip and before consumption in
interstate operations. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939) (sustaining tax
applied to railroad equipment brought into state in interstate commerce for the use in operation
or interstate railroad): Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939) (tax on equipment
shipped in interstate commerce to be used in interstate communications upheld).
21. Compare McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) (act of
transfering articles to purchaser at end of interstate journey is not part of commerce) with Joseph
v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) (stevedoring is an integral part of
commerce, exempt from privilege taxation).
22. E.g.. Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947); Utah Power& Light
Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); Eastern Air Transp., Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147
(1932). The state tax must be nondiscriminatorily applied to the local incident. See. e.g..
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) (upholding a use tax where equality was the
theme of the taxing statute).
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compressors for transporting natural gas in interstate commerce

3

A

privilege tax levied on the activities of maintaining, keeping in repair,
and otherwise manning pipe line facilities has been sustained. 4 In a
recent decision the Court again approved a privilege tax by isolating

various facets of interstate activity to find sufficient local incidents to
warrant the levy2 5 These decisions illustrate a tendency to fragment

interstate activity in order to find taxable local activities2 6 When single
events or the performance of single acts as local incidents upon which
a privilege tax can be imposed are found, the tax will be upheld.

The instant court, rejecting the contention that a taxable moment
had occurred in Tennessee, found that the fuel gas did not come to rest

in the state after it left the mains; the gas was in continuous flow and
never stopped moving until consumed.27 Therefore, the court held that

the gas was exempt from use taxation by the legislative declaration to
tax only property that had come to rest in the state2 Since the fuel
gas furnished the energy which operated the compressors required for

the interstate transportation of gas, the court determined that the fuel
gas was an integral part of interstate commerce.2

1

Suggesting that

Helson was controlling, irrespective of the statutory exemption, the
instant court concluded that the tax had been invalidly applied to the

privilege of using an instrumentality of interstate commerce.
The instant decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court is

demonstrative of the need for resolving the plethora of constitutional
approaches that have arisen in attempting to balance the competing
interests of the state's need for revenue with the necessity for a free flow
23. Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938). Louisiana
imposed a privilege tax on the use of mechanical power. The pipe line company had a number of
compressor stations within Louisiana operated by engines that used natural gas as fuel. Reasoning
that the tax was on the privilege of producing power, the Court held the tax was validly imposed
upon operations in connection with interstate movement.
24. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948). Upholding a Mississippi
franchise tax based on the capital used within the state by an interstate business, the Court
adopted a cumulative burdens test to determine whether the activities were so much a part of the
interstate business as to be under the protection of the commerce clause. See P. HARTNIAN. supra
note 12, at43.
25. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (Washington tax on the
privilege of doing business).
26. See Note, State Taxation of Interstate Connterce: Roadway Express, the Ditinishing
Privilege Tax Immnunity', and the Movement Toward Uniformity in Apportionnent, 36 U. Cni.

L. REV. 186 (1968).
27. 444S.W.2dat 139.
28. See note 3 supra.
29. 444S.W.2dat 139.
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of commerce among the states. In this attempt, courts have paid little
heed to the measure of the tax involved or the economic consequences
of its application,3 and, instead, have utilized as analytical tools such
phraseology as "taxable moment" and "local activity." While the
instant court's insistence upon a realistic distinction between taxable
privileges and privileged integral to interstate commerce is borne out by
judicial pronouncements, 3' a mechanical conception of the continuity of
interstate movement is espoused. Concerning itself with the physical

fluidity of the gas and the continuity of its movement until
consumption, the court erroneously concluded that the gas did not

come to rest within the state?2 Although this finding of fact abrogated
the necessity for any further determinations, the instant court felt
constrained to address the issue of whether the tax was constitutionally
permissible. Unfortunately, the court fails to consider whether the
exemption provision is an expression by the state legislature of an

intention to tax interstate commerce consistent with the Constitution
or an election not to exhaust its full power to tax?3 Furthermore, in

view of the criticism aimed at the preferential treatment afforded
interstate business 34 and the trend toward expansion of state taxing

power discernible in other areas of privilege taxation,31 it is regrettable
that the decision does not attempt to distinguish the number of
analogous cases that have found taxable local activities even though the
activities were indispensable to interstate commerce 6 The court thus
30. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) (any tax was invalid despite its
economic effect).
31: See note 8 supra.
32. This finding was despite the fact that the gas is diverted from the interstate mains and
is consumed. It appears that the court neglected any consideration of the purpose for such
diversion, a factor which should be more important than material properties of the subject of the
diversion. See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text. For additional reference to the
preoccupation with physical fluidity, see 32 TEXAS L. REV. 760 (1954).
33. Only one other state, Georgia, has an exemption statute similar to that of Tennessee.
GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3406a (1961). This statute was construed by the Georgia Supreme Court
as an election by the legislature not to exhaust its full power to tax. See Undercofler v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 221 Ga. 824, 147 S.E.2d 436 (1966) (holding that fuel and parts purchased and
brought into the state for use in interstate commerce were not subject to the state use tax).
34. See, e.g.. P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, at 146-47.
35. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (sustaining a tax
measured by gross receipts from interstate sales); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (approving a state income tax levied on the income from an
exclusively inierstate business).
36. The facts are largely indistinguishable from the case cited in note 23 supra. While the
instant case involves a use tax upon an article which is itself the subject of interstate carriage
and more closely proximates the facts of Helson, both taxes are privilege taxes and have the same
effect upon the interstate transportation of gas.
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reaches the harsh result of restricting state sources of revenue on the
basis of an ambiguous legislative declaration and without any
satisfactory determination of constitutional power 3 A more desirable
resolution would have been a careful analysis of the competing

economic factors in the tax and a determination of whether the free
flow of commerce would in fact be burdened..
Corporations- Corporate Director Accountable to Corporation
Under State Law for Profits Realized from Insider Stock Trading
Without a Showing of Damage to the Corporation
Plaintiffs, corporate stockholders, brought a derivative action
against the chairman of the board and the president of Management

Assistance, Inc. (MAI), alleging breach of fiduciary duty in the sale
of personal securities while in the possession of material inside
information.' Plaintiffs claimed that by use of the undisclosed
information, the defendants acquired large personal profits which
rightfully belonged to the corporation.2 Admitting that a corporate
director cannot use his position to obtain trading profits in corporation
stock, the defendants contended that MAI should not recover the
profits from the transaction in a derivative suit without an allegation
of damage to the corporation.3 The Supreme Court, New York

County, granted defendant's motion for dismissal, holding that the
37. "This abstinence from determining constitutional power by the instant court is
inconsistent with its other decisions extending state taxation of interstate commerce. See MidValley Pipeline Co. v. King, 221 Tenn. 724, 431 S.W.2d 277 (1968) (upholding an excise tax on
local activities of interstate business although incidental to the conduct of interstate commerce);
Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Atkins, 197 Tenn. 123, 270 S.W.2d 384, cert. denied, 348 U.S.
883 (1954) (holding valid a privilege tax for doing business in state even though exclusively
interstate).
1. MAI, involved in the leasing of computer installations to various business concerns,
lacked the capacity to maintain these installations as required by their lease agreements.
International Business Machines (IBM), the corporation engaged by MAI to perform this
function, sharply raised its rates for such service in August 1966. As a result, MAI's net earnings
dropped from $262,253 in July 1966 to $66,233 in August 1966. The defendants sold their shares
of, MAI with full knowledge of the earnings drop, but prior to its public release.
2. The defendants sold 56,500 shares of MAI stock at its high of $28 per share. Once the
earnings drop was announced, the stock declined to $11 per share. By selling before the drop,
they avoided a loss in excess of $900,000. All the stock was sold to outsiders; neither the
corporation nor the plaintiffs purchased any shares.
3. The defendants moved for dismissal under N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 321 1(a)(7) (McKinney
1963) which provides for dismissal for failure to state a claim.
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alleged wrong was not in relation to the conduct of the business of the
corporation but was a private transaction in the sale of securities.4 In
reversing the lower court's decision, the Appellate Division stated that
inside information was a corporate asset, and the use of this asset by
a corporate director for his own personal advantage was a breach of
fiduciary duty. 5 The New York Court of Appeals, held, affirmed.
Under common law, corporate directors are accountable to the

corporation for profits derived from their stock transactions while in
the possession of material inside information, without proof of damage

to the corporation. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.
2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).

Corporate directors, by virtue of their fiduciary duty to the
corporation, cannot use their positions of trust for personal advantage.6
When the breach of fiduciary duty results in an injury to the
corporation, relief may be sought in either a direct suit by the
corporation or a stockholder's derivative action 7 Under the derivative

suit, the vast majority of courts hold that the recovery should be of the
full corporate loss and inure to the corporation.8 With the exception
of the Delaware Chancery Court in Brophy v. Cities Service Co.,9
courts which have considered the question of profiting by the use of
inside information in securities transactions have not deemed it to be

an actionable breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation under
4. Brief for Appellant at 4, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301
NY.S.2d 78 (1969). The opinion of Gold, J.,
is unreported.
5. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Dep't 1968). The
original complaint was brought against a number of MAI's officers. The Appellate Division
modified the lower court order, reinstating the claim against Oreamuno, chairman of the board,
and Gonzales, the president. The lower court's decision was affirmed as to the other directors.
6. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295 (1939). For a discussion of the fiduciary duties of the corporate director, see H. HENN,
CORPORATIONS §§ 236-42 (1961).
7. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). The stockholder's derivative
suit involves the assertion of a corporate cause of action by an individual shareholder. Some of
the areas in which derivative suits have been allowed by New York courts include:
mismanagement by directors, Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940); misappropriation
of corporate assets, Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), affd mere., 263 App. Div.
815, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 131 (Ist
Dep't. 1941); misappropriation of corporate opportunities, Singer v.
Carlisle, 26 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct.), affd men., 261 App. Div. 897, 26 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep't
1940); sale of control, Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955). In each of these cases, there was a specific showing of injury to the corporation.
8. Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Iowa 1946). Courts have permitted shareholders
to recover individually in derivative suits on a pro rata share of the corporate recovery. See
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
9. 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
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common law.'" Reasoning that the corporation has no interest in its
outstanding shares, they conclude that there is no corporate injury in
insider trading." Only in the Brophy decision, which has never been
followed, has a court allowed a stockholder who is a third party to the
insider's stock transaction to maintain a derivative suit on the basis of
a breach of fiduciary duty. 2 Furthermore, courts have not permitted a
shareholder to maintain an individual cause of action merely upon the
basis of depreciation of the value of his stock, when the insider did not
actively defraud the stockholder. 3 Even where the stockholder did
purchase shares from the insider, the majority of courts have not
allowed an individual suit under common law since they reason that
no fiduciary duty extends to the trading of shares which are the
director's personal property. t4 At common law, the only remedy has
lain in jurisdictions which impose a limited fiduciary duty to disclose
inside information to the purchasing or selling shareholder when special
circumstances so dictate, 5 or in jurisdictions which impose such a duty
regardless of special facts . 6 These courts, however, allow relief only to
10. See, e.g., Equity Corp. v. Milton, 221 A.2d 494 (Del. 1966); Kaminsky v. Kahn, 20
N.Y.2d 573, 232 N.E.2d 837, 285 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1967).
II. These courts held that a director or officer occupied a fiduciary relationship to the
corporation's shareholders as a body with respect to corporate business and property. Since the
shares were his private property, the director's dealings in his personal securities were not
considered corporate transactions and thus involved no fiduciary duties. See H. HENN. supra note
6, at § 240. Prior to the instant case, New York courts followed this reasoning, See Hauben v.
Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Ist Dep't 1938), affd, 281 N.Y. 652, 22 N.E.2d 482
(1939); Stanton v. Schenck, 142 Misc. 406, 252 N.Y.S. 172 (Sup. Ct. 193 1).
12. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THlE STOCK MARKET 24 (1966). In the Bropiy
case, the defendant was an employee rather than a director or officer. The court held that when
an employee acquires confidential information in the course of his employment, he occupies a
position of trust towards that information analogous to that of a fiduciary. See also Mosser v.
Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
13. Henry v. General Motors Corp., 236 F. Supp. 854 (N.D.N.Y.), aJJ'd, 339 F.2d 887
(2d Cir. 1964). The practical aspects of allowing an individual's suit on the basis of depreciation
of stock resulting from the activities of an insider has militated against its use. Since all
std6ckholders have suffered the same wrong, allowing such suits would result in multitudinous
litigation. See Niles v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 176 N.Y. 119, 68 N.E. 142 (1903).
14. See, e.g., Chatz v. Midco Oil Corp., 152 F.2d 153, 155 (7th Cir. 1945). This view states
that the fiduciary duty extends only to corporate affairs and not to personal stock. Thus the
director or officer is not dealing with the corpus of his trust when he trades his own securities.
15. This view, called the "special facts" rule, was first enunicated in Strong v. Repide, 213
U.S. 419 (1909). Among the special circumstances that will invoke the rule are lack of a readily
ascertainable market value or the shareholders' lack of business experience. The New York courts
have followed this rule. E.g., Stanton v. Schenck, 142 Misc. 406, 252 N.Y.S. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
16. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967). This rule imposes
a fiduciary duty to disclose all relevant information to the purchasing or selling shareholder
regardless of special facts.
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the purchaser, and not to the corporation. Federal securities law

provides remedy for insider non-disclosure actions under sections

16(b)17 and 10(b) 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and under
rule lOb-5 promulgated by the SEC." Employment of federal remedies,
however, is limited and has left questions as to their exact scope and

applicability. Section 16(b), which allows corporate recovery in a
derivative suit against corporate directors, officers and beneficial
owners of ten percent of the corporation's shares, is available only

where the insider has made short-swing profits within the six-month
limitation period provided by the statute. 0 Other inherent limitations,

including the two-year statute of limitations and the requirement that
the stock involved be a registered security, severely restrict the effective
use of 16(b) 2 To fill this gap, federal courts have fashioned section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 into an effective bar against the speculative abuse

of confidential information in those areas not covered by 16(b). The
remedy under these two provisions is flexible, applying to any person
utilizing the inside information in the trading of any security, equity

or debt,22 with the private action taking the form of either a direct or
17. 15 U.S.C.§ 78p(b) (1964).
18. Id. § 78j(b) (1964).
19. 17 C.F.R.§ 240.10b-5 (1968).
20. The section states: "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or by any sale and purchase,
of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less
than six months ....
" Other provisions in the section include corporate recovery under a
derivative suit and a specific grant of exemptive power to the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
21. See Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL
L. REV. 45, 62 (1968). In addition to these limitations, the trend of recent opinions indicates that
the courts are attempting to soften the harsh application of section 16(b) by using a more
subjective standard in calling for a close look at the factual situation to determine whether the
violation was the type of activity that the act was meant to prohibit. Since the section itself does
not require scienter, the courts previously applied only a mechanical test, with the major factual
determination being .whether the purchase and sale were within the six-month period. See, e.g.,
Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb,
363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). Both of these cases adopted a
subjective approach.
22. "Itshall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . (a) [t]o employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968). The rule is
all-inclusive and covers any security by its own terms. However, there is no violation of the section
unless either interstate commerce, the mails, or a national exchange is used in the transaction.
See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE lOb-5 §§ 2.3, 11.2 (1969).
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a derivative suit. Courts have consistently sustained derivative actions
based on section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, but only where the corporation
as a whole was injured as a purchaser or seller 4 Although a few courts
have criticized the purchaser-seller requirement and have hinted at its
erosion, 2 recent cases still have held that profits from insider activity

will not inure to the corporation in a derivative suit unless damage to
the corporation is proven2

In the present case, the court relied on the principles of agency and
trust law to reach its decision. Stating that the corporate director is a

fiduciary of the corporation, the court held that the exploitation of
inside information by the director for his own personal advantage in
his stock transactions violated this fiduciary duty.27 The court stated
that the critical question was to determine who had the'higher claim

to the profits derived from the use of inside information, the
corporation or the director. Since a showing of damages is not
necessary to a cause of action based on breach of fiduciary duty, and

since the profits derived by the director resulted from a breach of this
duty, the court held that a sufficient cause of action had been stated
23. The rule itself does not'grant a remedy by its language. The federal courts have
consistently held that private persons have standing to sue to redress violations of rights granted
by section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. E.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d
Cir. 1956). All federal courts have now sustained a private right of action in this area. Ruder,
Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and
Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423,431 n. 46 (1968).
24. See, e.g., Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); McClure v. Borne
Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961). Other cases have tried further to restrict rule lob-5 by
creating deception and causation requirements. See Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
25. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (dictum); Vine v. Beneficial
Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). See Lowenfels, supra note
21. Mr. Lowenfels contends that relief under rule lob-5 should not be subject to rigid
prerequisites, but should give remedy to those shareholders whose shares have been diluted in value
by the insider's actions.
26. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1968); Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). There is some authority that
indicates that the injury requirement might be dropped, but to date, no court has allowed a
derivative action for damages under section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 where there has been no showing
of injury to the corporation from the insider trading with a non-stockholder. Cf. Ruckle v. Roto
Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (1964). Even the recent case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), which was the first decision to hold that insiders must return profits
gained by the use of inside information in a national exchange transaction, did not direct who
was to receive these profits.
27. The court stated: "[A] corporate fidiciary, who is entrusted with potentially valuable
information, may not appropriate that asset for his own use even though, in so doing, he causes
no injury to the corporation." 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
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to enable the corporation to recover the director's profits in a derivative
suit.28 Indicating that its decision was within the spirit of section 16(b),
10(b) and rule 10b-5, the court found that the insider's activity in the
instant case constituted the same sort of "abuse of afiduciary
relationship" as is condemned by federal law.29 Finding that the federal
remedies were extremely limited and not exclusive in this factual
situation, the court reasoned that it was imperative to create an
effective common law remedy by giving recovery to the corporation in
a derivative suit.
The instant decision provides an effective check on securities
trading by corporate insiders in an area where present state law has
been clearly inadequate Even in jurisdictions which have allowed the
purchaser a remedy in this situation, the operations of the national
stock exchanges have limited its effectiveness. In.the typical
transaction, the purchaser deals with his broker rather than directly
with the corporate insider. Furthermore the buyer usually orders his
broker to buy at the current price or to complete the transaction if the
market price is not above his "limit." Since the insider's offer to sell
would normally be close to the market price, it is difficult to discover
any injury.31 Due to the anonymity that characterizes such stock
transactions, the defrauded purchaser rarely knows he has dealt with
an insider and hence cannot seek to remedy the unjust transaction. 2
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act was designed to provide
such a remedy for registered securities, but it has only provided partial
relief because of its six-month limitation. Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
do not allow the corporation to recover in a derivative suit absent a
showing of damages to the corporation. Thus, the plaintiff is limited
in this situation to relief founded on fiduciary principles, a remedy
provided by the Court of Appeals in a manner closely resembling 16(b)
in policy and procedure. Both the present decision and 16(b) proceed
28.

The court did, however, parenthetically infer some damage by stating that such actions

by directors tarnish the corporation's image. Although somewhat vague on this point, the court
did not state that an inference of damage was necessary to the maintinence of the suit. Id.

29. The court also stated that the provisions of section 16(b) demonstrated that a derivative
action is an effective method for dealing with such abuses.
30. See text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
31. See Comment, Insider Trading Without Disclosure-Theory of Liability, 28

OHIO

ST.

L.J. 472, 475 (1967).
32.

Also, "[i]f there is no knowledge that an insider is buying, private recovery on the basis

of after-acquired knowledge would amount to a windfall, since the insider's activity would not
preclude the investor's loss." Note, A Suggested Locus of Recovery in National Exchange
Violationsof Rule lob-5, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 306, 308 (1969).
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on the theory that the corporation should be allowed to recover for
profits derived by insiders through the exploitation of their fiduciary
relationship.3 The instant decision reached this result by deeming the
utilization of corporate information for personal gain to be a violation
of the insider's fiduciary duty and by removing the procedural block
of the injury requirement. It provides both a practical safeguard
against fiduciary violations and a corporate recovery for the benefits
derived from the exploited information. This decision supplements the
remedy of 16(b) by extending beyond six months the check on the
misuse of corporate information.
Moreover, the court's decision implies a broader mandate which
would have the effect of prohibiting all insider trading under common
law fiduciary principles. From the outset, the court indicated that its
major concern was to check insider trading rather than to compensate
a corporation which was not ostensibly harmed. In relegating the
plaintiff's recovery to secondary importance, it recognized that the
primary function of an action for breach of fiduciary duty is to remove
from a fiduciary all inducement to utilize his position of trust for his
personal benefit.35 Although the present decision went further than
Brophy in not requiring the additional element of potential harm to the
corporation, future cases under the Diamond precedent may strip any
insider of his profits by adopting Brophy's reasoning that any employee
who acquires confidential information occupies a position of trust to
the corporation. Furthermore, there are strong public policy arguments
which would support the extension of this holding against an abuse of
such a position of trust by a mere employee. For example, uninformed
investors are equally disadvantaged vis-a-vis non-fiduciaries or lowerechelon agents trading on inside information as they would be by
33. The instant court recognized this in a quote from Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844
(2d Cir. 1959): "The undoubted congressional intent in the enactment of section 16(b) was to

discourage what was reasonably thought to be a widespread abuse of a fiduciary
relationship-specifically to discourage if not prevent three classes of persons from making private

and gainful use of information acquired by them by virtue of their official relationship to a
corporation." 248 N.E.2d at 913, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
34. The court's decision also is consistent with federal policy. According to a Senate
Report, there "was a flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors . . .who used the
confidential information . . .to aid them in their market activities." S. REP. No. 1455, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 55 (1934). These congressional hearings led to the enactment of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and demonstrate the policy underlying its passage.

35. The court quoted the Brophy decision, stating that: "[P]ublic policy will not permit an
employee occupying a position of trust and confidence toward his employer to abuse that relation

to his own profit, regardless of whether his employer suffers a loss." 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 83.
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corporate directors. This abuse, which cannot be effectively checked by
the purchaser because of the anonymity of the exchange, could be
arrested by the derivative suit employed in Diamond. A similar result

has been achieved in the suit under 10(b) and lOb-5 in Texas Gulf
Sulphur which extended insider liability to cover employees who held

material inside information. Here again, the result would be consistent
with federal securities law.
Another interesting possibility under the Diamond doctrine arises
because the gist of the wrong is misuse of the confidential information
rather than the possible damage done to the corporation. If the

fiduciary made full disclosure to the purchaser prior to his sale of
stock, but before full public disclosure of that same information, he

could be subjected to liability by the stockholders in a derivative suit,
even though there would be no liability to the purchaser

6

This result

would occur because the sale before public release still would involve
the fiduciary breach prohibited by Diamond-the utilization of inside
information for personal advantage 7 It is submitted that this result is

necessary in order that all investors trading on an impersonal exchange
have relatively equal access to material information. The use of inside

information permits the insider to trade on a much more realistic set
of probabilities and insulates him from the normal operations of supply

and demand that characterize stock transactions. The mere fact that
the insider has revealed his information to a single purchaser should

not exonerate him, for there is still an abuse of the securities system
36. Under the present decision, there also exists the possibility of double liability being
incurred by the insider. Presumably, the purchaser of the insider's stock, as well as the
corporation, would be successful in an action against the insider either under federal securities
law or in those state courts that hold an insider liable for trading without disclosure. The court,
although not specifically dealing with this question, suggested that the insider interplead any and
all possible claimants to the profits. The court's solution hardly seems viable in light of the
possible multiplicity of anonymous transactions that could occur in the purchase of his stock.
Finding all possible claimants to the profits would be virtually impossible. Two solutions to this
problem have been suggested: (I) Hold the insider liable to both the corporation and the individual
purchaser since he should not escape one liability merely because he has managed to incur
another. See Note, The Prospectfor Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded
Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1140-42 (1950); (2) Stay the corporate action to await the outcome
of the suit by the purchaser in his individual right. If the individual prevails, that recovery would
be used to diminish the damages recoverable by the corporation. See R. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS
701-02 (2d ed. 1949).
37. It is interesting to note that if the court had based its decision on the conversion of
corporate assets, as was partially done at the Appellate Division, the impact of the case would
have been even broader, for recovery would not be limited to an action against the insider. Under
this approach, the court conceivably could impose liability on tippees for conversion of a
corporate asset.
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in permitting the insider to take advantage of the undisclosed

information at the expense of a public which has no access to it. The
court in the present case recognized the considerable difference between

a corporate director who is subject to the same risks in stock
transactions as the ordinary investor and those directors who utilize
their position of trust to gain special advantage. The court did not
prohibit all trading by corporate insiders. Instead, it prohibited trading
that would result in profits obtained solely from access to information

not available to all investors. The decision implies that corporate
directors who wish to trade in their corporation's securities must either
divulge by public release all inside information which might affect the
price of the securities or abstain from trading altogether. Since the
underlying purpose of both state and federal securities law in this area
is to establish market integrity, this result is commendable as a step
towards equality among purchasers in their stock transactions.
National Banks-Investment Companies- National Banks May
Establish Collective Investment Funds
Pefitioner, First National City Bank of New York (Bank),
established a collective investment fund (Fund) designed to be the
functional equivalent of an open-end investment company' and to
compete with mutual funds by offering investment advisory service to
the small investor.2 The Fund was approved by the Comptroller of the

Currency as a fiduciary activity authorized for national banks by
section 92a of the Federal Reserve Act' and was registered with the
I. While the Fund operates in the same fashion as an open-end mutual fund, there are
several differences. Shares in mutual funds may be marketed through the regular channels of
public distribution, but units of participation in the Fund may be offered and publicized only
through the Bank's trust department. 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.18(b)(5)(iii), (iv) (1969). The major
attraction of the Fund is that the fee for management is I/% per annum while most mutual funds
have additional "load" charges ranging generally from 7r1 to 81/2%. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(12)
(1969). Finally, unlike mutual funds, the Fund is subject to the supervision of the Comptroller
as well as the SEC. This includes review of the Fund's investments to see that they are in
accordance with sound fiduciary principles. 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1964); 12 C.F.R. § 9.11(d) (1969).
2. The minimum investment allowed by the Fund is $10,000, and surveys have indicated
that individual sales of $10,000 or more have accounted for about half of the mutual fund
industry's total dollar sales. See generally Hearings on S. 2704 Befbre a Subcomn. of the House
Conmm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1966).
3. This statute gave the Comptroller the power to authorize national banks "to act as
trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee,
receiver, committee of estates of lunatics, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks,
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an open-end investment
company under the Investment Company Act of 1940.1 The Bank
applied to the SEC to have the Fund exempted from those provisions
of section 10 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 which require a
majority of the five-member committee supervising the Fund to be
unaffiliated with the Bank. 5 Contending that too much bank control
would jeopardize the position of the investors, 6 the National
Association of Securities Dealers7 (NASD) intervened before the SEC
to oppose the exemption. The SEC allowed the exemption on the basis
that the Fund would still be subject to all the safeguards necessary for
the protection of its investors. The NASD then petitioned the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia that the SEC order granting
the exemption be set aside.8 In a separate attack upon the Fund,
trust companies, or other corporations which come into competition with national banks are
permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is located." 12 U.S.C.
§ 92a (1964). Pursuant to this authorization, the Comptroller issued the following regulation
authorizing national banks to create collective investment funds: "Where not in contravention of
local law, funds held by a national bank as fiduciary may be invested collectively . . . [i]n a
common trust fund, maintained by the bank exclusively for the collective investment and
reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as managing agent under
a managing agency agreement expressly providing that such monies are received by the bank in
" 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(3) (1969).
trust ...
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a, 80b (1964), asantended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a, 80b (Supp. 11, 1965-66).
5. The Bank sougt exemption from the provisions of § 10 controlling the composition of
the board of directors of a registered investment company. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10(b)(3), -10(c),
-10(d)(2) (1964). On March 9, 1966, the Commission denied the Bank's request for relief under
§ 10(d)(2), whereby only one member of the board need be unaffiliated as regards investment
banks; however, the Commission did grant relief under §§ 10(b)(3) and 10(c), permitting 601c. of
the board to be affiliated with the Bank. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538 (March
9, 1966).
6. The NASD relied on section 6(c) of the Investment Company Act authorizing the SEC
to grant exemptions from the Act or any rule or regulation adopted under it "if and to the extent
that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the
protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions . . ." of
the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1964).
7. The NASD represents about 3,700 registered brokers or securities dealers. Most of its
members sell shares in mutual funds to investors and are compensated by sales commissions from
the "load" charged by the funds. NASD members stand to lose commissions because of
competition from the Fund.
8. The petition for review of the SEC's order was previously dismissed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia on the ground that the NASD lacked standing as a party
aggrieved under section 80a-42(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. NASD v. SEC. No.
20164 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 1967). A petition for rehearing en bane was granted and the division
opinion vacated on January 1, 1968. The en bane order was subsequently vacated on April 12,
1968, to permit the assigned division to reconsider the matter. The case is before the court again
to be considered without reargument.
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respondent, Investment Company Institute (ICI),' brought suit in
federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating so
much of the Comptroller's Regulation 9"' as permits the Bank to
operate the Fund on the ground that the Fund was not a fiduciary
activity allowable under state law, but was a principal-agent
arrangement designed to circumvent the restrictions on the power of
national banks to deal in securities imposed by section 16 of the GlassSteagall Act." The Comptroller and the Bank answered that the Fund
was a valid fiduciary activity and did not violate the Glass-Steagall
Act. The district court held for the ICI. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia,'2 held, reversed. When a national
bank creates a collective investment fund in a state where state banks
may provide similar services, the fund is an allowable fiduciary activity
and may be exempted from the requirement that a majority of the
supervisory committee be unaffiliated with the bank. NASD v. SEC,

1969 CCH

FED. SEC.

L.

REP.

92,438 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 1969).

The Bank created its Fund on a foundation of.statutory and
regulatory authorization. Originally there was no express statutory
authority for national banks to deal in securities; consequently, banks
were irnpliedly prohibited from doing so. 3 Because the banks had
devised a method for circumventing this prohibition," Congress in 1927
passed the McFadden Act granting national banks the authority to
engage in the business of underwriting and dealing in investment
securities. 5 Then, as a result of the financial panic of 1929, Congress
9. The ICI is an unincorporated national association, having as its'members 177 open-end
management investment companies. 88 investment advisers, and 78 principal underwriters. The
open-end management investment companies which are members of the ICI have assets of $36
billion, representing about 94'; of the assets of all such companies in the United States.
10. 12C.F.R.§ 9.18(1969).
II. This section places the following limitation upon banks dealing in securities: "The
business of dealing in securities and stock by the [national banking] association shall be limited
to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and

for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the association shall not
underwrite any issue of securities or stock.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (Supp. III. 196567).
12. The Comptroller and the Bank then individually appealed to the court of appeals where
their cases were consolidated for decision with the petition for review tiled by NASD.
13. Eg., First Nat'l Bank v. National Exchange Bank. 92 U.S. 122 (1875): -leckner v.
Bank of the United States, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 338 (1823).
14. Because of this implied limitation, national banks established sdcurity affiliates,
organized under state law, and used these to realize profit from underwriting and dealing in stocks
and other securities.
15. 'Provided, That the business of buying and selling investment securities shall hereafter
be limited to buying and selling without recourse marketable obligations evidencing indebtedness
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passed the Glass-Steagall Act and the Securities Act of 1933 aimed at
divorcing investment banking from commercial banking. The GlassSteagall Act was designed to protect bank depositors from the
insolvency which resulted from the widespread investment of bank
assets in speculative securities. This Act curtailed the power of national
banks to engage in securities transactions by prohibiting the affiliation
of banks with securities dealers, by forbidding interlocking directorates
between investment companies and banks, and by limiting the bank's
activities to the purchase and sale of securities on customer order. 6 The
Securities Act of 1933 was designed to protect the investors by
requiring securities dealers to provide potential customers with a
prospectus describing the management of their account, its policies and
objectives, and the right of participants therein; in addition, the Act
required the account to be registered with the SEC. 7 Later, in an effort
to protect shareholders of mutual funds against dishonest and unethical
practices on the part of those selling securities, Congress passed the
Investment Company Act of 1940. This Act provided for the
registration of investment companies, the election of investment
advisors and directors by the participants, the approval of auditors by
the participants, the issuance of semi-annual reports to shareholders,
and the dominance of the board of directors by members not affiliated
with investment bankers. The Act also authorized the SEC to grant
exemptions from the requirements of the Act, provided the exemptionsare "necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with
the protection of investors."'" The regulatory body, the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors (Board), did not authorize national banks to act
as managing agents for collective investment funds until the middle
1930's when it issued Regulation F. This regulation was subsequently
revised to limit the creation of collective investment funds to those
accounts held for a "bona fide fiduciary purpose. 2 ') The Board
consistently took the view that a common trust fund should not be
permitted for the sole purpose of providing the investor with the bank's
investment management services. 2' In 1962, however, when regulation
of any person, copartnership, association, or corporation, in the form of bonds, notes and/or
debentures, commonly known as investment securities.
... Act of Feb. 25, 1927, Pub. L. No.
639. ch. 191. § 2(b), 44 Stat. 1226.
16. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(seventh), 78, 377, 378 (1964).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1964).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8, -15(a)(3), -16(a).-31(a)(2), -29(d), -10 (1964).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1964).
20. FRB Reg. F, 12 C.F.R. § 206.10(c) (1939).
21. See 42 FED. RES. BULL. 228 (1956): 41 FED. RES. BULL. 142 (1955); 26 FED. REs. BULL.
390 (1940).
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of the fiduciary activities of national banks was transferred from the
Board to the Comptroller, 22 the Comptroller was specifically granted
the power to permit national banks to engage in any fiduciary activity
permitted to state banks under state law. 2 3 Consequently, in April,
1963, the Comptroller, under the power granted him to regulate the
fiduciary activities of national banks, issued revised Regulation 9,21
deleting the "bona fide fiduciary purpose ' 25 requirement and
2
authorizing national banks to pool managing agency accounts. 1
The court27 reasoned that although the Fund was not a traditional
trust arrangement, it was a true fiduciary activity within the purview
of section 92a of the Federal Reserve Act.2 8 Since New York law
permits state banks to establish commingled managing agency
accounts,2 the court held that the Comptroller did not exceed his
statutory power 0 when he issued revised Regulation 931 and approved
the Fund established pursuant thereto. In support of its decision, the
court pointed out that the regulatory power of the Comptroller,
together with the restrictions of the Securities Act of 1933, would
insure the proper supervision of this broad fiduciary activity. Noting
the differences between the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Glass-Steagall Act, 32 the court concluded that the words "security"
22. 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1964).
23. Relevant to the impact of the Comptroller's statutory power is the fact that even though
New York banking law does not specifically authorize the commingling of funds held by a
managing agent, the New York State Banking Department has given formal approval, under the
authority of the state banking laws, to commingled managing accounts of two New York banks.
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100 (McKinney 1950), as amended, (Supp. 1968-69). Also relevant to the
Comptroller's authority, is an earlier decision that an agent who manages and commingles funds
held for a principal under a contractual agreement is still a trustee and the relationship is a
fiduciary arrangement. Brown v. Christman, 126 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
24. 12C.F.R.§ 9.18(1969).
25. 2 Fed. Reg. 2976 (1937).
26. "Where not in contravention of local law, funds held by a national bank as fiduciary
may be invested collectively . . .in a common trust fund, maintained by the bank exclusively
for the collective investment and reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its
capacity as managing agent under a managing agency agreement expressly providing that such
monies are received by the bank in trust.
...
12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(3) (1969).
27. Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge Burger filed concurring opinions stating the reasoning
of the court. Since Judge Bazelon dealt in detail with the validity of the Fund, his reasoning is
hereinafter set forth as that of the court. In its per curiam opinion, the court expressed some
reservations about the standing of the parties to initiate this action, but it resolved the question
in favor of NASD and ICI so that the case could be decided on its merits.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1964).
29. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100 (McKinney 1950), as amended, (Supp. 1968-69).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1964).
31. 12C.F.R.§ 9.18(1969).
32. Note, Commingled Trust Funds and Variable Annunities: Unijbrm Federal Regulation
of Investment Funds Operated by Banks and Insurance Companies, 82 HAtV. L. REV. 435 (1968).
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and "underwriter" as they appear in the Securities Act have a much
more expansive meaning than the same words used in the GlassSteagall provision forbidding national banks to "underwrite any issue
of securities or stock . . . . 33 Therefore, it reasoned that banks may
establish collective investment funds which are registered as securities
under the Securities Act of 1933 and at the same time are considered

to be fiduciary arrangements not in violation of the Glass-Steagall
prohibition. The court also found that since the Fund is a fiduciary

activity whereby the Bank buys and sells securities for the account of
customers, the Fund is but one aspect of the single entity, the Bank,

and therefore is not in violation of the Glass-Steagall restrictions
against interlocking directorates and affiliations between personnel of
commercial banks and security dealers2 4 The court concluded that

since the Fund is a fiduciary arrangement with inherent prohibitions
against wilfull mismanagement "5 and is subject to the dual supervision

of the Comptroller and SEC,3 the SEC exemption allowing a majority
of the directors of the Fund to be affiliates of the Bank is allowable

as consistent with the purpose of the Investment Company Act; that
is, to protect the investors against the dangers of bank dominated
security affiliates.
The instant decision is a landmark in the developihent of the
expanding scope of national banking powers. The immediate effect of

the court's holding is to permit national banks to compete on a large
scale in the collective investment fund market. Although numerous

problems must be solved before collective funds of national banks can
realize their competitive potential,37 the impact of the present decision
33. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (Supp. II,1965-67).
34. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377-78 (1964).
35. The court held that since the Bank has created the Fund to compete with mutual funds
it will neither retain income-producing assets in the form of excessive cash deposits nor use them
to offset its loans. Also, since the Fund must of necessity deal primarily in stock, there is no real
basis for concern that the Bank will use the Fund to further its limited banking business. Lastly,
since the Bank must obtain favorable prices in order to compete with other collective investment
funds, there is no danger of its allotting brokerage to existing or potential Bank customers.
36. The Comptroller is charged with regulation of the fiduciary activities of national banks.
12 U.S.C. § 92a (1964). The Fund, as a registered open-end investment company with the units
of participation therein registered as securities, is subject to the supervision of the SEC.
37. There are two major problems facing the Fund: investment level and public solicitation.
The Bank has concluded that in order to operate its Fund profitably, it must establish a minimum
investment level of $10,000. Wvhile a figure this low will allow the Bank to compete for a great
number of mutual fund customers, it is evident that if the limit were lowered the competition
would be increased. The biggest problem facing the Bank, however, is public solicitation. While
mutual funds are allowed to publicly solicit for purchasers of their interests, the Bank is limited
to advertising the Fund through the means of a financial report available upon request. See
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is evidenced by the forecast that the opening of the mutual funds area
to the banking industry will divert two billion dollars to banks over the
next five to ten years.' Nevertheless, the correctness of this decision is
doubtful. While the reasoning of the court is superficially persuasive,
the decision permits national banks to engage in an activity which has
never been expressly considered by Congress. As a matter of fact, the
court opens to national banks a fruitful area of investment closed to
them since the enactment of post-Depression legislation. Since
Congress acted in the wake of the financial panic of 1929 to close the
doors allowing national banks to underwrite investment securities, it is
doubtful that the judicial branch is the proper forum to reopen those
doors. By a very literal reading of the statutory provisions involved, the
court reached a logical result, but one probably never intended by the
legislative branch. This mechanistic approach never really deals with
the basic policy issue: did Congress intend to authorize national banks
to operate open-end mutual funds. Since the potential development of
banks into large institutional investors will have a profound effect upon
the nation's economy, the entrance of banks into the mutual fund
market should be a matter of express legislative study and
consent-not a matter of statutory construction. The instant decision
will now force Congress to act promptly to accept or reject this judicial
formulation of national banking policy.
Public Welfare-Section 402(a)(23) of Social Security Act
Neither Prohibits State Reductions of ADC Grants Nor Compels
Affirmative Increases
Two Negro women brought a class action' against various
members of the Louisiana Board of Public Welfare,' seeking to enjoin
the defendants from enforcing a proposed ten percent reduction in Aid
Comment, Of Banks and Mutual Funds: The Collective Investment Trust, 20 Sw. L.J. 334, 349
(1966).
38. Hearings on H.R. 8499. 9410 Be/bre the Conunerce and Finance Subcontin. oJ the
House Coin,. on Interstate and Foreign Connerce. 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1964).
I. The suit was brought on behalf of the plaintiffs, their children, and all other persons
receiving aid under the Louisiana ADC program. Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F. Supp. 336, 338 (E.D.
La. April 15, 1969).
2. The defendants included Garlin L. Bonin as Commissioner of the Louisiana Board of
Public Welfare, Camille Adams as Chairman of the Board, John J. McKeithen as Governor of
the state and ex-officio member of the Board, and 8 other members of the Board. Id.
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to Dependent Children' (ADC) grants. Plaintiffs also sought
declaratory relief, contending 3 that section 402(a)(23) of the Sociil
Security Act' prohibited the proposed ADC reduction and required

states to take affirmative steps to increase current payment levels
commensurate with rises in the cost of living. The Board of Public
Welfare defended the reduction proposal as a necessary .concomitant to
a recent Supreme Court decision' which had spawned a sudden increase
in eligible ADC recipients.' Defendants further contended that such a

reduction would be entirely consistent with section 402(a) (23), which
they insisted imposed no inhibitions on state manipulations of ADC

payments prior to July 1, 1969! In a three-judge decision, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana upheld the
defendants' position,8 retaining jurisdiction over the question of
whether section 402(a)(23) required an affirmative increase in ADC
appropriations by July 1, 1969.1 In a subsequent decision, held,

judgment for the defendants."0 Section 402(a)(23) of the Social Security
3. The plaintiffs originally submitted additional arguments; First, the Proposed ADC
reduction, unaccompanied by corresponding reductions in other categories of public assistance,
denied them equal protection of the law; second, the proposed reduction was violative of section
601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964). The latter argument was based
on the fact that 807o of Louisiana A DC recipients were Negroes.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (Supp. 1968): "A State plan for aid and services to needy
families with children must . . .provide that by July I, 1969, the amounts used by the State to
determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs
since such amounts were established, and any maximums that the State imposes on the amount
of aid paid to the families will have been proportionately adjusted."
5. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). This decision had the effect of compelling Louisiana
to make ADC payments to families previously ineligible to receive aid under the "'man in the
house" policy. Prior to King v. Smith, payments had been withheld from families in which the
parent and a member of the opposite sex were not married, but either lived together as man and
wife and maintained a common household or had continuous intimate relations while living in
separate households. See 22 VAND. L. REv. 219 (1968).
6. Because of King v. Smith, it has been estimated that 200,000 to 400,000 persons in the
District of Columbia and 18 states should have cause for ADC reinstatement. N.Y. Times,
May 19, 1968, at 32, col. I. See 22 'VAND. L. REV. 219, 222 (1968).
7. The defendants asserted that section 402(a)(23) required only that ADC need standards
and maximums be adjusted to compensate for rising living costs by July 1, 1969. Since
the statutory language did not expressly refer to increasing payments, the defendants maintained
that such a requirement should not be read into the provision.
8. Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. La. 1969). This initial decision was rendered
on April 15, 1969.
9. The court retained jurisdiction because it concluded that the issue concerning the increase
requirement was not ripe for adjudication. Although the Louisiana legislature had not enacted a
new appropriations bill, the court noted that additional funds to ADC might be included in the
.pending appropriations bill. Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F. Supp. 336, 346 (E.D. La. 1969).
10. By July I, the Louisiana legislature had met and adjourned without increasing the level
of payments of families with dependent children. Although the Department raised its standard of
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Act neither prohibits state reductions in ADC payments, nor requires
affirmative increases in grant levels. Lampton v. Bonin, 38 U.S.L.W.
2084 (E.D. La. July 16, 1969), deciding final issue of 299 F. Supp. 336

(1969).
During the depression, Congress enacted the Social Security Act
of 1935, which established the ADC program to aid needy children."

Although the ADC program is financed largely by the federal
government, it is administered by the states, whose welfare plans must
conform to the Social Security Act and be approved by the Secretary

of HEW. Prior to January, 1968, state administrators had enjoyed
approximately 35"years of complete freedom in determining their ADC

need standards and corresponding payment levels. 2 Recognizing the
chronic inadequacy of ADC payments, Congress abruptly curtailed this
freedom by enacting section 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act. This
provision expressly commanded that by July 1, 1969, states adjust their
ADC need standards and grant maximums to reflect changes in the

cost of living.' 3 While section 402(a)(23) has been subjected to
conflicting interpretations, legislative history reveals that Congress was

seeking not only to provide for pre-July 1 elevation of standards and
maximums, but also to compel simultaneous increases in payments."
need to reflect a 20% rise in living costs, it reduced the actual ADC payments. Lampton
v. Bonin, 38 U.S.L.W. 2084 (E.D. La. July 16, 1969). The second decision was rendered on July
16, 1969.
II. See 76 YALE L.J. 1234 (1966-67).
12. 299 F. Supp. 336, 352 (1969).
13. See note 4supra.
14. Section 402(a)(23) was introduced before the Senate Committee on Finance as a
proposed amendment by HEW to H.R. 12080, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967). In its original form,
the amendment called for the states to update their need standards to reflect current prices and
to meet need in full as they determined it. Hearings on H.R. 12080 Before the Senate Contin. on
Finance, 90th Cong., ist Sess., pt. 1, at 635 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings]. This
amendmeit, along with similar proposals for the adult categories of assistance, was designed to
meet the problem of inadequate assistance payments by compelling increases in the current level
of payments. Testifying in support of the proposed amendments, the Secretary of HEW John W.
Gardner and Under-Secretary Wilbur J. Cohen documented the inadequacy of assistance
payments, especially in the ADC program. 1967 Hearings, pt. I, at 216, 255-59. Though the
original proposals were extensively modified, the provisions adopted by the Senate, which were
contained in the Senate Report under the heading "Increasing Income of Recipients of Public
Assistance," were undoubtedly intended to ameliorate the same problem of low level assistance
grants by requiring states to increase payments. S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
The Senate passed these provisions and sent the bill to a Senate-House Conference Committee
where the mandatory increases for adult assistance programs were abolished. No similar change
was made in the ADC provision, which remained mandatory upon the states. The annual cost of
living adjustment was deleted and replaced by a single adjustment before July I, 1969. CoNF. RtLp.
No. 1030, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967). The evolution of section 402(a)(23) from its inception
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One year after section 402(a)(23) was enacted, HEW promulgated a
regulation' 5 to guide the states in their compliance with this provision.
Contrary to apparent congressional intent, the regulation permitted the
states arbitrarily to reduce ADC grants any time prior to July 1, 1969,
and did not provide for eventual payment increases. Recently, district
courts in New York"6 dnd Texas' 7 have held that the HEW regulation
erroneously construes section 402(a)(23) and thereby defeats the
fundamental legislative objective underlying the provision. Both courts
recognized in section 402(a)(23) an unequivocal congressional purpose
to bolster ADC payment levels and hence prohibit grant reductions
subsequent to the enactment of the provision.
In the instant case, the court initially concluded that section
402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act imposed absolutely no inhibitions
on state manipulation of ADC payments prior to July 1, 1969. In
reaching this conclusion, considerable reliance was placed on H EW's
interpretation 8 of the provision embodied in its newly-issued
regulation.' 9 Therefore, Louisiana's proposed ten percent grant
reduction was held not to violate section 402(a)(23).20 In its subsequent
decision,' the court was called upon to define the precise requirements
of section 402(a)(23). Attempting to delineate these requirements and
before the Senate Committee on Finance until its enactment by Congress manifests clearly that
it was designed to compel the states to raise ADC payments.
15. HEW Reg. § 233.20(a)(2)(ii), 34 Fed. Reg. 1394 (1969): "In the AFDC plan, provide
that by July I, 1969, the State's standard of assistance for the AFDC program will have been
adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such standards were established . . . . In
the event the State is not able to meet n~ed in full under the adjusted standard, the State may
make ratable reductions in accordance with subparagraph 3(viii) of this paragraph.
(emphasis added).
16. Rosado v. Wyman, 37 U.S.L.W. 2698 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 1969).
17. Jefferson v. Hackney, N.D. Tex. 1969, cited in Lampton v. Bonin, 38 U.S.L.W. 2084,
2085 (E.D. La. July 16, 1969).
18. The court justified its reliance on HEW's opinion by citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S.
I (1965), which held that "When faced with a problem of statutory construction, great deference
[will be placed on] the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration." 299 F. Supp. 336, 341 (1969).
16.
19. See note 15 supra.
20. In its first decision, the court held that section 402(a)(23) did not abridge the plaintiffs'
rights to equal protection of the law or violate section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
equal protection holding was based on the court's determination that each public assistance
program stands on its own and is subject to independent state administration without regard for
the policies of the other programs. As to the civil rights question, the court reasoned that while
80 of Louisiana's ADC recipients were Negroes, a majority of blind and disabled welfare
recipients were also Negroes. In addition, there was no showing that the proposed ADC cut was
motivated by racial prejudice.
21. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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at the same time clarify its original position, the court reasoned that a
clear distinction should be made between "adjusting" the standard of
need and "meeting" the adjusted standard. In applying a literal
interpretation to the statutory language, the court ultimately concluded
that section 402(a)(23) required states to raise ADC standards and
maximums by July 1, 1969, but imposed no affirmative compulsion to
increase payments by a proportionate amount2
If the court had initially given proper consideration to the
legislative history and intended practical effect of section 402(a)(23),23
it would inevitably have concluded that Louisiana's proposed ADC
reduction could not withstand the strictures of that provision. The
court based its decision upon the mistaken premise that section
402(a)(23) did not require an increase in payments prior to July 1,
1969, and thus could not impinge upon a state's freedom to reduce
grants before that date.24 The court's interpretation of the provision,
however, is not in accord with the most reasonable meaning of the
language embodied therein2 Since the practical construction of the
22. Recognizing the economic detriment to ADC recipients inherent in its interpretation of
section 402(a)(23), the court suggested 3 possible motives that could have prompted Congress
to pass the provision: first, to increase the standard of need and make persons with marginal
incomes eligible for ADC payments; secondly, to eliminate the use of arbitrary dollar maximums.
and lastly, to emphasize the disparity between need and payments. Judge Cassibry. however, in
his dissenting opinion to the second decision, vividly demonstrated the inadequacy of each
suggested motive. Interpreting section 402(a)(23) to require state increases in ADC payments by
July 1, 1969, he concluded that the Louisiana reduction was invalid. Lampton v. Bonin, 38 U.S.
L.W. 2084, dissenting opinion at 2-6 (Civil No. 68-2092) (E.D. La. July 16, 1969).
23. See note 14 supra. Obviously, the intended effect of section 402(a)(23) was to require
states to increase their current ADC payments as well as need standards and maximums.
Otherwise Congress would not have provided 18 months for compliance with the provision. A
revision of current standards and maximums would have required only a spontaneous
administrative adjustment of figures. Raising ADC payments would presumably necessitate an
assemblage of the state legislature. Since July I, 1969, was the earliest date by which all state
legislatures could convene in regular session, Congress established this date as a deadline for
raising payments.
24. This fallacy in the court's reasoning is fully discussed in Judge Cassibry's dissenting
opinions to both decisions. Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F. Supp. 336, 346 (E.D. La. 1969); 38
U.S.L.W. 2084, dissenting opinion (Civil No. 68-2092) (E.D. La. July 16, 1969).
25. Judge Cassibry provided a complete analysis of the meaning most reasonably imported
by section 402(a)(23): -ADC payments in all states are predicated upon the need standard: if this
standard is increased as section 402(a)(23) requires, the budgetary deficit must also increase
accordingly. In those states paying the budgetary deficit in full, as well as in those states that
pay only a percentage of the budgetary deficit (or standard of need), section 402(a)(23) necessarily
requires increased ADC grants corresponding to the increase in the standard of need, for a
percentage maximum (1007 or less) kept constant automatically translates increased need into
increased payment. Similarly, in those states imposing an arbitrary dollar maximum on the size
of the assistance grant, section 402(a)(23), by requiring that the maximums imposed be adjusted
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words harmonizes with the legislative history,6 the recent case law, 27
and the purpose logically attributable to Congress, 21 section 402(a)(23)

unquestionably commands the states to increase ADC payments no
later than July 1, 1969,'"and prohibits any reduction in payments before

that date. The construction of section 402(a)(23) offered by the court
stresses the precise words of the statute to the exclusion of clear
congressional purpose. This interpretation permits the states to wholly
emasculate the potentially beneficial effects of the provision by
sanctioning deep cuts far below the level of actual need. In short, this

restrictive construction ignores the urgent necessity for increased ADC
payments29 and renders section 402(a)(23) virtually meaningless 30 The

net result of Louisiana's raising its standard of need without
concomitant elevation of payments will be to increase the number of

persons eligible for benefits at the expense of those already on relief.3'
It is inconceivable that Congress intended to allocate this additional
cost of the ADC program to the most poverty-stricken members of

society. In addition to subverting legislative intent, the instant decision
might have a significant undermining effect on the nation's already
inadequate ADC program. The present program is under severe attack
from all quarters of the country,3 2 with lack of funds representing the

most acute problem.33 Moreover, this fund shortage is destined to
in accordance with the change in the cost of living, insures increased grants for all recipients.
Regardless of which system of computing ADC payments the state follows, section 402(a)(23) is
therefore designed to effectuate increased ADC recipient grants. The language of the statute could
not be any clearer." 299 F. Supp. 336, 350 (1969).
26. See note 14 supra.
27. Jefferson v. Hackney, N.D. Tex. 1969, cited in Lampton v. Bonin, 38 U.S.L.W. 2084
(E.D. La. July 16, 1969); Rosado v. Wyman, 37 U.S.L.W. 2699 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 1969).
28. It is fundamental that the court must apply "reason and common understanding to
reach the results intended by the legislature." Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
29. The majority of the court indicated regret over the harshness of the decision it felt
compelled to render. Lampton v. Bonin, 38 U.S.L.W. 2084, opinion at 10 (Civil No.
68-2092 (E.D. La. July 16, 1969).
30. As was indicated in Rosado v. Wyman, 37 U.S.L.W. 2699 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 1969),
the majority's view in Lanipton provides for "a mere administrative adjustment without effecting
any substantive change."
31. Id.
32. When President Johnson signed the 1968 Social Security Act amendments, he stated:
"The welfare system today pleases no one. It is criticized by liberals and conservatives, by the
poor and the wealthy, by social workers and politicians, by whites and by Negroes in every area

of the nation." HEW,

WELFARE IN REVIEW

20 (May-June 1968).

33. The current crisis stems in part from the fact that Congress has consistently
appropriated a larger proportion of aid to the aged, even though, among the ranks of the poor,
the young far outnumber the old. There are approximately 15 million poor under age 18 in
contrast to 1.5 million poor over age 65. B. WEISBROD, THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY 11 (1965).
In 1965, aid to dependent children accounted for 32.6% of public assistance expenditures, whereas
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become much more critical if the number of eligible recipients
continues to increase at the present appalling rate 4 By allowing a state
to reduce ADC grants in circumvention of an unequivocal federal

mandate, the instant decision can serve only to intensify A DC's current
economic plight. Furthermore, if widely followed, this decision will

move the nation another step away from uniform application of public
assistance and will cultivate the present inequities deriving from
diversity among the states.

Taxation- Deductions- Wife's Traveling Expenses Deductible
When Her Presence Serves Her Husband's Business Purpose
Roy 0. Disney, President and Chairman of the Board of Walt
Disney Productions,' made several business trips2 to manage the

company and to promote its "family-oriented" image

In conformity

with company policy, he took his wife on these trips and was
reimbursed for her travel expenses.' His wife spent a considerable
amount of time arranging for and hosting social functions, making
good-will visits, attending press conferences, and attending various
38.6% went to the aged. In the South, the respective figures were 18.2% and 65.1%. SOUTHERN
REGIONAL COUNCIL, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN THE SOUTH 11 (1966).
34. For example, in 1967 the number of those added to ADC rolls increased three times as
fast as in most previous years. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1968, at 38, col. 7. Further impetus was
added to the increase-rate in 1968 by the decision in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See
notes 5-6 supra.
I. The company specializes in "family-type" entertainment. It produces family-oriented
motion pictures for theaters and television, operates Disneyland Park, publishes books and
magazines, merchandizes items modeled after Disney created characters, and distributes films to
schools and other markets. Business is conducted world-wide, with representatives, subsidiaries,
and licensees in 58 foreign countries. United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir. 1969).
1 2. In January, 1962, Mr. Disney and his wife spent three weeks in New York,
Paris, and
London while he met with company sales representatives and held screenings of the company's
products for exhibitors. Later in 1962 they made a three month world tour on company business.
In 1963, the Disneys went to Europe on a business trip, and in August of that year made a
business trip to Colorado, Wisconsin, and New 'ork. Id. at 784-85.
3. As chief executive officer of the company, Mr. Disney held meetings with the company's
sales force, held screenings of the company's products for exhibitors, and attended trade
conventions and conferences. He was expected to cultivate cordial relationships with the executives
with whom the company dealt, to enhance the morale and enthusiasm of company representatives,
and to promote the public image of the company as one engaged in family-type entertainment.
Id. at 787.
4. The company had a long-standing policy that executives would take their wives on trips
when their presence would enhance the company's image or otherwise promote the company's
interest. Consistent with this policy, the company paid for the wives' expenses on such trips. Id.
at 785.
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business-oriented events at which women were present.5 Internal
Revenue refused to allow the taxpayer to exclude the reimbursed

amounts from gross income or to deduct them as ordinary and
necessary business expenses.6 In an action to recover income taxes paid,
the district court held that the wife's reimbursed travel expenses should
be excluded from gross income On appeal to the Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed, on the ground that the amounts
were deductible as business expenses

Where the dominant purpose of

the wife's presence in accompanying her husband on a business trip is
to serve her husband's business purpose, and where she actually spends
a substantial amount of time assisting him, the amount reimbursed for

her travel expenses is deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1969).

The tax treatment of reimbursed expenses has created perplexing
problems that have not yet been resolved.' Amounts paid by an
employer as .reimbursements ordinarily must be included in gross

income from which the actual expenses incurred may be deducted;"°
5. Mrs. Disney attended meetings of employees, exhibitors, distributors, business associates,
the press, and the public. She did not perform any secretarial-type duties, nor did she attend
daytime business meetings. She spent much of the day attending to her husband's laundry, taking
telephone calls, and shopping. Id.
6. There was no dispute over the fact that the trips were business trips for Mr. Disney, or
over the fact that the company could deduct as business expenses the amount paid for Mrs.
Disney's travel expenses. The Disneys kept careful records of their expenses and accounted to the
company for each trip. They made no claim to a refund for amounts spent on items classified
by them as personal expenses. Id.
7. Disney v. United States, 267 F. Supp. I (C.D. Cal. 1967), noted in 20 ALA. L. REV.
169 (1967).
8. Although the court noted that the appeal raised the question of whether reimbursements
are includible in the taxpayer's gross income, the court without explanation stated that it preferred
to treat the deductibility question and affirm on that ground.
9. For a discussion of the problems in the treatment of reimbursed moving expenses, see J.
CHo.vIIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 24 (1968). Although there is already a
code section requiring that reimbursements for basic moving expenses be included in gross income,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 217, there has been a suggestion that new legislation is needed to
resolve the problem of incidental reimbursed moving expenses. 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 705, 711
(1967). For an attempt to unravel the "'numerous and complex" tax problems that arise when
an employer pays for a trip to a business convention, see Osborn, What's the Tax Rule, TRIAL,
Apr.-May, 1968, at 59.
10. I J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcoNIE TAXATION § 6.05, at 23 (rev. ed. W.
Oliver 1962). At one time the treasury regulations required that reimbursements for travel
expenses were to be included in gross income and the actual expenses incurred deducted. Treas.
Reg. 118 § 39.23(a)-2(c), 1956 FEDERAL TAX REGULATIQNS 557. Prior to the tax years in the
instant case the regulation was changed and Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(b)(1) (1958) provides: "The
employee need not report on his tax return (either itemized or in total amount) expenses for travel,
transportation, entertainment, and similar purposes paid or incurred by him solely for the benefit
of his employer for which he is required to account and does account to his employer . . . for
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however, courts have frequently allowed such reimbursements to be
excluded from gross income when the amounts were not intended as
compensation." Courts have long held that the reimbursement of

actual travel expenses incurred by an employee on behalf of his
employer does not result in income to the employee.12 The reimbursed

expenses of an employee's wife may also be excluded from gross
income when she accompanies her husband on a noncompensatory
business trip and her presence serves the employer's business purpose."
In Allen J. McDonell, 4 an employee accompanied the winners of the
company's sales contest and their wives to Hawaii. The company,

considering the presence of the'employee's

wife essential to the

enhancement of the company's image with the vacationing couples,

paid her expenses for the trip. The court found that since the company
had a business reason for the wife's presence, the trip did not constitute
disguised remuneration, and therefore the expenses of the trip were not
which the employee is paid through advances, reimbursements, or otherwise, provided the total
amount of such advances, reimbursements, and charges is equal to such expenses. In such a case
the taxpayer need only state in his return that the total of amounts . . . received from the
employer as advances or reimbursements did not exceed the ordinary and necessary business
expenses paid or incurred by the employee." The regulations also cover the situation where the
reimbursements are in excess of expenses, Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(b)(2) (1958); where the expenses
are in excess of the reimbursements, Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(b)(3) (1958); and, where the employee
is not required to account to his employer for his expenses, Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(c) (1958).
These regulations, dealing with what the employee must report on his own return, appear to be
procedural and do not affect the substantive question of when reimbursements are in fact
compensatory in nature. See Graves, Reimbursed Expenses, 105 J. ACCOUNTANCY 27 (June 1958).
11. E.g., Homer H. Starr, 46 T.C. 743 (1966); cf. Alex Silverman, 28 T.C. 1061 (1957),
affd, 253 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958) (reimbursement included in income because wife's presence
had no business purpose). Professor Chommie says that the theory underlying the exclusion of
reimbursements for basic moving costs, an analogous situation, is that they constitute employer
costs. J. CHOMMIE, supra note 9, at 49-50. Since all compensation for personal services, regardless
of the form of payment, is included in gross income, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(1), it is
arguable that amounts paid by an employer to his employees constitutes taxable income unless
the employee can prove that the amounts were intended as gifts. According to the brief submitted
on behalf of the Disneys, such an argument was made by the government in the instant case. Brief
for Appellees at 14, United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1969). However, the fact
that there is no donative intent in a reimbursement situation does not necessarily mean that
amounts expended by an employer to send an employee on a business mission were intended as
compensation to the employee. In any event, courts have not required a showing that a gift was
intended in excluding reimbursements from gross income where the amounts were not intended
as compensation. See, e.g., Gotcher v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Tex. 1966).
12. J.S. Cullinan, 5 B.T.A. 996 (1927); Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc., 25 T.C. 463 (1955)
(an African safari, not taken for pleasure, but for the benefit of the corporation).
13. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. United States, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9131 (W.D. Tenn.
1960); Gotcher v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Tex. 1966).
14. 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 115 (1967).
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includible in the employee's gross income. 5 The courts, however, have
required inclusion of reimbursements for both the husband and the wife
when the trip was primarily for pleasure and was considered a reward
If the
or compensation to the employee for his services.
reimbursements are reported in gross income, the question becomes
whether the taxpayer may deduct the expenses incurred. By statute, the
taxpayer's business expenses are deductible,' 7 and it is well settled that
if his wife accompanies him on a business trip her travel expenses are
deductible if her presence serves a bona fide business purpose of her
husband. 8 The deduction is usually allowed 9 when the wife's services
replace the need for an employee to perform the same services; 20 but,
the deduction is usually denied when the wife's activities are primarily
of a social nature.2 ' In Warwick v. United States,2 2 however, an
executive was allowed to deduct his wife's travel expenses upon showing
that she made friends with customers, toured their factories, and made
it possible for her husband to be entertained in the homes of customers.
15. Id. at 117.
16. Rudolph v. United States, 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1961), petition jbr cert. dismissed,
370 U.S. 269 (1962) (Justices Douglas and Black dissented on the ground that expenses paid by
an employer for its employees and wives to attend a business convention should not be regarded
as income to the employees.); Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1961).
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
18. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(c) (1958). "Where a taxpayer's wife accompanies him on a
business trip, expenses 'attributable to her travel are not deductible unless it can be adequately
shown that the wife's performance on the trip has a bona fide business purpose. The wife's
performance of some incidental service does not cause her expenses to qualify as deductible
business expenses." Id.
19. "Each case will, naturally, turn on its own facts and there is no ready yard-stick rule
of thumb for determining which traveling expenses are personal and which are incurred in the
pursuit of a trade or business." 4A J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 25.99, at 362 (rev. ed. J. Riordan 1966).
20. See, e.g., Poletti v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1964) (operator of an
employment agency was allowed to deduct his wife's travel expenses when she accompanied him
on a trip to California to assist in the opening of an agency and while there worked full time in
the agency office); John C. Thomas, 8 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
39,112, at 186 (B.T.A. 1939)
(professional singer was allowed to deduct his wife's travel expenses because she performed
valuable business connected services which occupied most of her working time). See also Rich,
A Wife's Tax Value: Tax Aspects of a Wife's Attending Conventions, Sales Meetings. Etc.,
N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAX. 895, 896 (1964); Sax, A Wife's Traveling Expenses, 37 TAXES
595 (1959).
21. L.L. Moorman, 26 T.C. 666 (1956); William H. Johnson, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
66,164, at 964 (1966). Although the taxpayer in Johnson contended that his wife helped him
promote his company's products and its image at a sales convention, the court denied the
deduction because there was not enough evidence to show that the wife's presence was of
substantial benefit to the conduct of her husband's business and there were no facts regarding
the amount of time she spent in assisting him. Id.
22. 236 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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The deduction was allowed because the wife's presence on those trips
helped her husband retain a special relationship between his company
and its large European customers, was directly attributable and
appropriate to his business, and assisted him in winning yearly
bonuses. 23 The test for a bona fide business purpose is not the
characterization of the wife's activities as social or business, but
whether under the circumstances the wife's presence and activities
perform a business function.
The instant court, recognizing that the first question raised by the
appeal was whether the reimbursed travel expenses of the taxpayer's
wife were includible in the taxpayer's gross income, stated that it
preferred instead to consider the deductibility question.! The court
began with the basic premise that in order for the wife's expenses to
be deductible they must be ordinary and necessary in connection with
her husband's business as distinguished from his employer's business.25
The court considered the critical inquiries to be, first, whether the
dominant purpose of the wife's presence was to serve-her husband's
business purpose in making the trip, and secondly, whether she actually
spent a substantial amount of her time in helping him fulfill that
purpose." Agreeing with the trial court's finding that the taxpayer's
business purposes were to promote the company's image, to enhance
the morale of company representatives, and to cultivate close and
cordial relations with business associates 2 1 the court upheld the finding
that Mrs. Disney's presence and assistance were necessary in order for
her husband to fulfill his business purpose. 28 The court added that if
Mr. Disney had occupied a less powerful position in the company, the
necessity for taking his wife would have been dictated by employer
insistence. Since a junior executive, performing the same duties on such
trips, would have been warranted in concluding that disregard of the
23. Id. at 767.
24. 413 F.2d at 786.
25. Id. at 786-87.
26. Id. at 788.
27. Id. at 787.
28. Mrs. Disney apparently performed the services that the company expected of her on
the trip. Although much of it was social in nature, that was precisely the business activity she
was expected to engage in. The company felt her presence invited additional publicity from the
women's pages and furthered the company's family-oriented image. Disney v. United States, 267
F. Supp. I, 3 (C.D. Cal. 1967). The company also believed that her attendance at a screening
could make "a material difference in the reception accorded a film and in the outcome of a
distribution agreement." Id. Since part of Mr. Disney's business was to obtain favorable publicity
and to promote the acceptance of the company's products, his wife's presence also served his
business purpose. See eases cited notes 35-36 infra and accompanying text.
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company policy might jeopardize his advancement, the court reasoned
that Mr. Disney's conformance with the policy was justified and that
he had adequately established that his wife's presence on the trip had
a bona fide business purpose when tested by his own business purpose
for making the trips 9
Although a decision for the taxpayer was proper, it is unfortunate
that the court chose to base its result on the deductibility issue without
first disposing of the includibility issue. Since the trial court expressly
found that the reimbursed travel expenses were non-compensatory in
nature, ° the amounts should have been excluded from the taxpayer's
gross income unless the court determined that the trial court clearly
erred in its finding The court's avoidance of the includibility issue
creates confusion as to the procedural treatment of reimbursed
expenses32 because it is unfair to require a taxpayer to establish his right
to a deduction before the court has determined that the amounts would
otherwise be taxable 3 The court's emphasis on company policy as a
factor in determining deductibility was misguided because the fact that
a company has an established policy of reimbursing its executives for
the expense of taking their wives on business trips is relevant to the
includibility of the reimbursements in the employee's gross income.
Such a policy strongly suggests that the reimbursements have an
independent significance to the company and therefore are not intended
to be compensation to the employee. Company policy should be given
little, if any, weight on the question of deductibility since what the
29. 413 F.2d at 787-88.
30. The trial court's finding included the following: "Mrs. Disney's presence on the round
the world trip, the two trips to Europe and the domestic trip served to enhance the corporate
image abroad, she assisted her husband in business activities, and her travel was for a bona fide
business purpose. The payment of Mrs. Disney's travel expenses by Walt Disney Productions was
not intended to be conpensatory in nature. Reimbursement of Mrs. Disney's travel expenses was
properly excluded from gross income of the taxpayer." (Emphasis added). Trial Court's Finding
No. 21, as quoted in Brief for Appellees at 9, United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783 (9th Cir.
1969).
31. SeeFED. R. Civ. P.23(b).
32. According to the approach taken by the court, a taxpayer should report reimbursements
in gross income; while according to the express language of the appropriate treasury regulations
it is not necessary to report such reimbursements as gross income. See note 10 supra and

accompanying text.
33. A distinction should be drawn between an administrative determination to use the
mechanics of including all reimbursements in gross income and then deducting actual expenses
incurred, see note 10 supra. and a judicial determination that reimbursements which are
compensatory in nature should be included in gross income and taxed unless they can be deducted
as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Cf Huffaker, New T & E Regulations Raise Basic
Ouestions Concerning Gross Income, 18 J. TAXATION 90 (1963).
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company considers ordinary and necessary to the conduct of its
business should not control what is ordinary and necessary to the
conduct of the business of its executives and employees 4 However, in
the instant case the scope of the taxpayer's business was practically
identical with that of the company's business, therefore, Mrs. Disney's
presence could be found to have a bona fide business purpose with
respect to her husband's business and the company's business. The
appellate court stressed the business purpose of the wife in connection
with her husband's business in determining that the husband was
entitled to a deduction, 35 while the trial court found that since Mrs.
Disney's presence had a bona fide business purpose in connection with
the company's business, the company did not intend the
reimbursements to be additional compensation to her husband;
therefore, the amounts were not includible in the taxpayer's gross
income?6 The proper approach would be to look first to the company's
business purpose to determine whether the amounts were includible in
the taxpayer's gross income. If the amounts are included, then
determine whether they are deductible as ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred in the conduct of the taxpayer's business. Despite
shortcomings in the court's approach, the introduction of the
"substantial" time" guideline may prove helpful in future cases. Since
the statute conditions deductibility on the expenses being ordinary and
necessary to the taxpayer's business, guidelines should not look to the
motive behind the trip but rather determine the business function served
by the wife's presence on the trip. Probably the most helpful approach
in determining the question of deductibility lies in a c*6mbination of the
"substantial time" guideline used in Disney and the "directly
attributable" and "appropriate" guidelines used in Warwick3 These
guidelines reflect the statutory requirement by focusing on the business
function of the wife's behavior rather than the motive for her presence,
and provide relatively objective criteria for determining deductibility.
34. See Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1961). CompareAllenberg Cotton Co.
v. United States, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9131 (W.D. Tenn. 1960), with Joy L. Zubrod, Sr., CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1967-204.
35. United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1969).
36. Disney v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 1, 2-4 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
37. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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Taxation-Section 514 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act Does Not Prohibit State Sales and Use Taxes on NonResident Servicemen
The United States' instituted a civil suit against the Tax
Commissioner of the State of Connecticut seeking a declaration that
the imposition of sales and use taxes2 on non-resident servicemen

stationed in the state in compliance with military orders violates
I. In the district court, the United States was joined as plaintiff by Lieutenant Schuman,
a Navy officer and domiciliary of Nebraska. Although Lieutenant Schuman had incurred a use
tax, his complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the requisite
jurisdictional amount was not alleged and that the eleventh amendment forbids a suit in the
federal courts by a private individual against a state. United States v. Sullivan, 270 F. Supp. 236,
246-47 (D. Conn. 1967).
2. CON. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 12-406 to 432a (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1967). The
significance of this decision is evidenced by the fact that forty-five states have similar sales and
use taxes. CCH STATE TAX GUIDE 'r60-000, at 6021 (2d ed. 1969). See also J. HELLERSTEIN.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION. CASES AND MATERIALS 15 (3d ed. 1969); 3 REPORT OIFTHE SPECIAL
SUBCON\II. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY. STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE. H.R.

REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., IstSess. 607-20 (1965). Thirty-five states including Connecticut filed
amicus curiae briefs in support of Connecticut's position. These states and their relevant statutes
are as follows: ALA. CODE tit. 51, §§ 786(3), 788 (Supp. 1967); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421309, 42-1408 (1956) (the sales tax, section 42-1309, is a privilege tax levied on the retailer, not
on the consumer); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 6051, 6201 (Supp. 1968-69); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 138-5 (1963) (combined sales and use tax); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.05 (Supp. 1969)
(combined sales and use tax); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3402a (Supp. 1968) (combined sales and use
tax); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 439.3. 441 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969) (the sales tax, section
441, is a privilege tax on the retailer); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-3603, 79-3703 (Supp. 1968); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 139.200, 139.310 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:302 (1950) (combined
sales and use tax); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 1811, 1861 (Supp. 1968-69); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, §§ 325, 373 (1965). as amended, (Supp. 1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 64H. § 2, & ch.
641, § 2 (Supp. 1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 7.522, 7.555(3) (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 297A.02, 297A.14 (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 144.020, 144.610 (Supp. 1968-69); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 77-2703 (Supp. 1967) (combined sales and use tax); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 372.105,
372.185 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:32B-3, 54:32B-6 (Supp. 1968-69); N.Y. TAX LAW
§§ 1105, 1110 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-164.4, 105-164.6 (1965), as amended, (Supp.
1967); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-39.2-02, 57-40.2-02 (Supp. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 5739:02.
5741.02 (Baldwin 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 1304, 1402 (1966); Oregon (no statute);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3403-201, 3403-204 (Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 44-1818, 44-18-20 (Supp. 1968); S.D. CODE §§ 1045-2, 10-46-2 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 673003, 67-3005 (Supp. 1968); TEX. TAX-GEN. ANN. arts. 20.02, 20.03 (Supp. 1968-69); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 59-15-4, 59-16-3 (Supp. 1969): 'VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-441.4. 58-441.5 (1969); WASH.
REV. Com.l ANN. §§ 82.08.020, 82.12.020 (Supp. 1968); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-291, 39-311
(Supp. 1969).
3. In addition to Lieutenant Schuman who paid a use tax on a used motorboat purchased
from a non-retailer in Connecticut, the district court took notice of four other examples of the
imposition of sales and use taxes on non-resident servicemen. Two of the examples involved the
assessment of sales taxes on purchases of new cars in Connecticut, while a third example presented
a situation identical to that of Lieutenant Schuman's. The fourth example dealt with the levy of
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section 514 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act which
prohibits all taxes "in respect of personal property."' The State of
Connecticut contended that there is a distinction between the annually
recurring personal property taxes contemplated by section 514 and the
privilege taxes imposed by the state. The district court accepted the
position of the United States and held that the Connecticut sales and
use taxes constituted taxation "in respect of personal property"' within
the scope and intent of section 514. The Second Circuit affirmed,7 and
a use tax with credit for sales taxes paid in Florida on the purchase or a new car. 270 F. Supp.
at 241 n.2 (stipulation of facts. May 24, 1967. incorporated into the court's opinion).
4- Section 514 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, as provided in section 17 of
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942, and codified at 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 574 (1964), provides: "(I) For the purposes of taxation in respect of any person, or of his
(personal) property, income or gross income, by any State, Territory, possession or political
subdivision of any of the foregoing, or by the District of Columbia, such person shall not be
deemed to have lost residence or domicile in any State, Territory, possession or political
subdivision of any of the foregoing, or in the District of Columbia, solely by reason of being
absent therefrom in compliance with military or naval orders, or to have acquired a residence or
domicile in, or to have become resident in or a resident of, any other State, Territory, possession
or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the District of Columbia, while, and solely by
reason of being, so absent. For the purposes of taxation in respect of the (personal property,)
income, or gross income of any such person by any State, Territory. possession, or political
subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the District of Columbia, of which such person is not a
resident or in which he is not domiciled, compensation for military or naval service shall not be
deemed income for services performed within, or from services within, such State, Territory,
possession, political subdivision, or District, (and personal property shall not be deemed to be
located or present in or to have a situs for taxation in such State. Territory, possession, or
political subdivision, or district.) Where the owner of personal properly is absent front his
residence or domicile s6lely byrreason of compliance with militarr"or naval orders, this
.ection
applies with respect to personal property, or the use thereoJ ithin any"tax jurisdiction other than
such place of residence or donticile, regardless of where the owner nta" be serving ht compliance
with such orders: (Provided. That nothing contained in this section shall prevent taxation by any
State. Territory. possession, or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the District of
Columbia in respect of personal property used in or arising from a trade or business, if it
otherwise has jurisdiction. This section shall be effective as of September 8, 1939, except that it
shall not require the crediting or refunding of any tax paid prior to October 6, 1942.
"(2) When used in this section, (a) the term 'personal property' shall include tangible and
intangible property (including motor vehicles), and (b) the term 'taxation' shall include but not
be limited to licenses, fees, or excises imposed in respect to motor vehicles or the use thereof:
Provided. That the license, fee, or excise required by the State, Territory, possession, or District
of Columbia of which the person is a resident or in which he is domiciled has been paid.")
The portion of the statute in parentheses was added in 1944, 58 Stat. 722; the portion in
italics was added in 1962, 76 Stat. 768.
5. United States v. Sullivan, 270 F. Supp. 236 (D. Conn. 1967). The district court later
amended its decision to permit Connecticut to continue to collect sales and use taxes from nonresident servicemen, provided that the amounts would be refunded if the judgment was ultimately
sustained.
6. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. ApP. § 574 (1964).
7. United States v. Sullivan. 398 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1968).
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on appeal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed. The provisions of
section 514 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act do not
proscribe the imposition of state sales and use taxes on non-resident
servicemen stationed in the state pursuant to military or naval orders.
Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
The constitutionality of federal legislation exempting servicemen
from the burdens of taxation imposed by the state in which they are
stationed pursuant to military orders is well established Thus, in 1940,
Congress dealt specifically with the problem of state sales and use taxes
as they relate to federal areas by enacting the Buck Act? This Act gave
the states the power to levy sales and use taxes in federal areas, except
with respect to the sale or use of property sold by the United States
or its instrumentalities through commissaries and ship's stores. 0 In
that same year, Congress also passed the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act of 1940." This Act contained no reference to sales and use
taxes and pertained only to taxes on property or income. 2 Section 514
of the Act was added by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
Amendments of 1942.' The purpose of this section was to prevent
multiple state taxes on the property and income of non-resident
servicemen. 4 Since it had been stated that section 5 14 did "not affect
the right of a State to assess personal property taxes on property within
its jurisdiction" with the consequent result of multiple taxation of
personal property "during the same calendar year,"'" subsequent
amendments were enacted in 194416 to clarify the intent and purpose
of section 514 in the area of personal property taxes.' 7 The amendments
provided that "personal property shall not be deemed to be located or
8. See. e.g., Pittman v. Home Owners' Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939). The Court has not only
upheld exemptions for servicemen, but also exemptions which reach beyond the activities of
federal agencies and corporations to private parties who have contracted to carry on functions
with the Federal Government. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
9. Buck Act, 4 U.S.C.§§ 105-110(1964).
10. Id.§ 107.
II. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 54 Stat. 1178 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App.
§§ 501-590 (1964), as anended. (Supp. III 1968)).
12. 54 Stat. 1190.
13. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942, ch. 581, § 17, 56 Stat.
769 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 574 (1964)), quotedin note 4 supra.
14. S. REP. No. 1558, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 2198. 77th Cong..
2d Sess. 6 (1942).
15. S. REP. No. 959, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1944).
16. Act of July 3, 1944, Pub. L. No. 415, 58 Stat. 722, amending 50 U.S.C. APP. § 574
(1964).
17. S. REP. No. 959, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1944).
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present in or to have a situs for taxation" in the non-resident state. 8
Congress thereby reiterated its position that the 1942 amendments were

designed to "relieve persons in the service from liability of double
taxation by being moved from one state to another under orders."'" In

addition, Congress enacted subsection (2) which provided in part that
section 514 included within its exemption "licenses, fees or excises
imposed in respect to motor vehicles or the use thereof."2 In 1953, the

Supreme Court rejected an argument by the State of Colorado that a
host state could levy an annual personal property tax if the home state
did not and held that the right to tax servicemen was reserved to the
domiciliary state regardless of whether it chose to exercise that right.2'

The Court concluded that Congress had not legislated solely against the
possibility of multiple taxation, but had chosen the broader technique
of awarding the sole right to tax to the domiciliary state. In 1965, the

Supreme Court, interpreting subsection (2), held that a state could
collect only those fees "essential to the functioning of the host State's

[vehicle] licensing and registration laws" and that recurring taxes
indistinguishable from annual ad valorem taxes could not be imposed

regardless of how they were labeled. 22 Section 514 was again amended
in 1962 to bring the statute to its present status.23 The state statute
involved in the instant decision24 provides for the imposition of a three
and one half percent sales tax on the gross recdipts of personal property
sales within the state.2 5 The statute places liability for the tax on the

retailer, but permits him to collect the tax from consumers.2 In fact,
the Supreme Court of Connecticut has held that the sales tax is a tax
on the purchaser.2 The use tax is imposed at a similar rate on the
18. 58 Stat. 722 (1944).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1514, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944).
20. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942, 50 U.S.C. Ari'P. § 574(2)
(1964).
21. Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953). This case involved a recurring personal
property tax levied by Denver, Colorado, on a Louisiana domiciliary stationed in Colorado. In a
7-2 decision, the Court held that such a levy was prohibited by section 514.
22. California v. Buzard, 382 U.S. 386, 395 (1966).
23. Act of Oct.' 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-771, 76 Stat. 768. This amendment was
precipitated by the case of United States v. Arlington County, 326 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1964).
Virginia attempted to impose a personal property tax on the property of a non-resident
serviceman who left his property in the state while on sea duty. The tax was disallowed.
-24. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 12-406 to 432a (1964). as amended, (Supp. 1967).
25. Id. § 12-408(l).
26. Id. § 12-408(2).
27. Avco Mfg. Corp. v. Connelly, 145 Conn. 161, 140 A.2d 479 (1958).
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privilege of using, storing, or consuming property in Connecticut; 28
however, property subject to the sales tax is exempt from the use tax.
The use tax is also imposed on the purchase of motor vehicles, boats,
or airplanes from non-retailers. Finally, the use tax allows a credit for
taxes paid in sister states. Although 45 states impose similar sales and
use taxes, 9 no court had ruled on the status of such taxes under section
514 prior to the present case3
In the instant decision, the Court noted that a tax on the transfer
of property for consideration and a recurring personal property tax are
dissimilar 3 Since these taxes are dissimilar and since Congress was
evidently aware of the existence of state sales and use taxes when it
enacted section 514,32 the Court concluded that Congress did not intend
to include sales taxes within the protective scope of the "in respect of
personal property" clause of section 514? In regard to the use tax, the
Court determined that although such a tax was not clearly excluded
from the provisions of section 514, its imposition was not precluded by
that section's history, purpose, or language. The Court indicated that
the legislative history of the section is noticably free of references to
sales and use taxes, even though Congress had dealt specifically with
such taxes in the Buck Act. The Court further found that the purpose
of section 514 was not contravened by sales and use taxes since these
taxes are imposed only once. The Court also decided that the language
of the section provides no indication that sales and use taxes are to be
proscribed. The word "use" is employed only twice in the entire
section-once in the 1944 amendment and again in the 1962
amendment.34 The Court reagoned that since both amendments were
35
deemed by Congress to be only clarifications of the original section,
28. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 12-411(1) (1964). "The use tax is not a tax on property but
is described inthe act as, and in fact is, in the nature of an excise tax upon the privilege of using,
storing or consuming property." Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 307,
57 A.2d 128, 134 (1948).
29. See note 2 supra.
30. One writer, however, anticipated the applications of the sales tax to servicemen
stationed in a state pursuant to military orders. Comment, State Power to Tax the Service
Member: An Examination of Section 514 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 36 MIL.
L. REV. 123, 142 (1967).
31. 395 U.S. at 175. See, e.g., Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921). See
generally N. JACOBY, RETAIL SALES TAXATION 3-4 (1938).
32. Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110 (1964) (originally enacted as 54 Stat. 1059 (1940)).
33. 395 U.S. at 175-76.
34. See note4supra.
35. S. REP. No. 959, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1944); H.R. REP. No. 1514, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1944); S. REP. No. 2182, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1962); H.R. REP. No. 2126, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1962).
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the utilization of "use" in these amendments added nothing to the
original purpose of the section. In conclusion, the Court held that the

purpose of the section was not thwarted because the sales and use taxes
were levied only once, credit was given for taxes paid in other states,

and the burden on the non-resident serviceman was small.
The construction of section 514 adopted by this court should be
acclaimed by the states, especially those with large military

populations

7

Although prior decisions 8 and the holdings of the lower

courts in the instant case liberally construed the Soldiers' and Sailors'

Civil Relief Act generally and section 514 specifically, a similar
decision in the present case would have involved a doubtful analysis of
the statute and its legislative history and would have placed
considerable administrative 2 and revenue burdens 0 on state
governments. Sales and use taxes, which avoid multiple taxation

through the tax credit provisions,4 furnish an effective means for
collecting revenue from servicemen to offset expenditures on services

for this population segment. Where tax credit is not available, however,
the purpose of section 514 would be clearly contravened, and such taxes
would no doubt be contrary to federal law. Although the Court failed

to enunciate the tax credit requirement, the probability of litigation on
36. The Court found that all necessities and many luxuries could be purchased tax free at
commissaries. 395 U.S. at 179 (citing stipulation of facts incorporated into the district court's
opinion, 270 F. Supp. at 241 n.2).
37. For example, California has 345,000 servicemen stationed in the state, 300,000 of which
are non-residents. Brief for the States of California and Illinois as amici curiae at 2, Sullivan v.
United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969). Texas has a service population of 206,377. Brief for Texas
as amicus curiae at 2, Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
38. The Court has stated that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act should be read
"with an eye friendly to those who dropped their affairs to answer their country's call." Le
Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U.S. I, 6 (1948).
39. Among the administrative burdens are: the necessity of inquiring of each purchaser
concerning his service status; the difficult problem of checking on gross receipts received by
retailers to assure proper reporting of taxable income; and the possibility that servicemen may
use their exemption to purchase for non-servicemen. Brief for the State of California and Illinois
as amici curiae. Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969); Brief for Texas as amicus curiae,
Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
40. For example, California collects $3,000,000 yearly from non-resident servicemen in the
form of state and local sales taxes. Brief for the States of California and Illinois as amici curiae
at 2, Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969). Texas collects sales taxes on the purchases
made with the $860,398,667 annual military payroll paid to servicemen stationed in the state.
Brief for Texas as amicus curiae at 2, Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969). In fact,
Connecticut derived 35.2% of its total revenue from its sales and use taxes. Brief for Appellants
at 20 n.19, Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
41. Most states have provisions for tax credit for taxes paid in other states. See P-H STArt
& LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES TAX UNIT, T

92,963, as cited in 395 U.S. at 180 n.36.

1969]
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this point is slight since credit is unavailable in only five states.42 Thus,
the Court in this decision blends an excellent analysis of the statute and
its legislative history with a balancing of the practicalities involved and
reaches a legally sound and economically laudable result.
42.

CCH STATE TAX GUIDE j 60-000, at 6013 (2d ed. 1968).

